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FCPA SANCTIONS: TOO BIG TO DEBAR?
Drury D. Stevenson* & Nicholas J. Wagoner**
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) criminalizes bribery of
foreign government officials. The frequency of enforcement actions and
severity of fines levied against corporations under the FCPA have
significantly increased in the last few years. There is an ongoing problem,
however, with the sanctions for FCPA violations: enforcement authorities
(the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission)
and contracting officials have limited themselves to fines, civil penalties,
and occasional imprisonment of individual violators. Debarment from
future federal government contracts, even temporarily, is an unused
sanction for FCPA violations, even though Congress provided for this
punishment by statute. Debarment offers a far more potent deterrent than
fines and penalties, as multinational contractors that conduct business with
the United States are much less likely to view the sanction as merely a cost
of doing business. If ridding foreign markets of corruption truly is a top
priority of the United States, it seems both unfair and imprudent for federal
agencies to continue awarding lucrative, multi-billion dollar contracts to
firms recently prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining them overseas.
Enforcement officials shy away from debarring entities that violate the
FCPA due to the short-term inconvenience of an agency’s inability to
transact business with its favorite contractor, its inability to demand
favorable bids from contractors when the field of potential bidders has
thinned, the resulting job loss, and the risk of overdeterring companies that
might otherwise pursue lucrative opportunities in emerging markets. This
is the “too big to debar” problem—the federal government is too dependent
on a particular set of large, private sector corporations for equipment and
services. In addition to the virtual immunity from debarment enjoyed by
these firms when they violate the FCPA, the fines imposed for engaging in
foreign corrupt practices comprise a tiny fraction of the potential revenue
generated by lucrative contracts with the United States and foreign states.
When discounted by the low probability of detection, these sanctions are far
too low to deter unlawful activity.

* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law (Houston, TX). The authors would like to
thank Professor Mike Koehler for lending his thoughtful feedback and expertise.
** Nicholas Wagoner will join Roger, Morris & Grover’s public law practice in November
2011.
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Debarment would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate actual
offenders. The deterrent would induce more firms to comply with the law,
which would allow the “too big to debar” problem to diminish over time.
To help illuminate these concerns and lend support to the thesis, this Article
will examine the third largest FCPA-related enforcement action to date:
the BAE Systems case.
On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems paid
approximately $400 million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. In the
year that followed, however, the federal government awarded BAE
contracts in excess of $6 billion. The United States’ refusal to debar BAE
because of the potential “collateral consequences” provides a case study
on the benefits and drawbacks of deterring foreign corruption through
suspension and debarment. This Article concludes that the United States
must begin to diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that
prosecutors may leverage the legitimate threat of suspension and
debarment to more effectively deter foreign corruption.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 777
I. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 780
A. The Dark Side of Foreign Corruption ...................................... 780
B. Theories of Deterrence ............................................................. 781
C. Enforcement of the FCPA ......................................................... 783
1. Enforcement Authorities .................................................... 783
2. Growth in FCPA Enforcement........................................... 784
3. Dearth of Case Law ........................................................... 786
4. Trends ................................................................................ 786
D. Legislative History ................................................................... 787
E. The Provisions of the FCPA ..................................................... 790
F. Sanctions ................................................................................... 793
1. Criminal Sanctions ............................................................. 793
2. Civil Sanctions ................................................................... 795
3. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ............................................... 795
4. Alternative Fines Act ......................................................... 796
5. Confiscation of Bribery and Proceeds of Bribery .............. 797
a. Civil Disgorgement ...................................................... 797
b. Civil Forfeiture ............................................................ 797
6. Prohibition from Participating in Public
Contracts/Advantages ....................................................... 797
II. BAE SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION ............................... 798
III. DEBARMENT AS A METHOD OF DETERRING FOREIGN CORRUPTION . 802
A. The Fallacy of Corporate Fines as a Deterrent........................ 802
1. Corruption as a Cost of Doing Business ............................ 802
2. Mixed Messages Sent by Monetary Sanctions .................. 803
3. Abusive Monetary Sanctions ............................................. 804
B. The Law of Suspension and Debarment ................................... 806

2011]

TOO BIG TO DEBAR?

777

C. Suspension and Debarment as a “Corporate Death
Sentence” ................................................................................ 807
D. Benefits of Debarment .............................................................. 807
1. Increased Compliance Without Increased Enforcement
Costs .................................................................................. 807
2. Increased Self-Disclosure Without Increased
Enforcement Costs ............................................................ 808
E. The Discretionary Debarment Decision ................................... 809
1. Are Corrupt Government Contractors “Too Big to
Debar”? ............................................................................. 809
2. Prosecutors’ Influence over Debarment Decisions ............ 810
F. H.R. 5366: Overseas Contractor Reform Act .......................... 811
G. The “Collateral Consequences” of Debarment ....................... 813
1. Concern for Diplomatic Consequences.............................. 815
2. Concern for Creating a Monopoly ..................................... 816
3. Concern for Economic Consequences of Overdeterrence . 818
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 820
INTRODUCTION
“A bribe is seen as a charm by the one who gives it; they think success
will come at every turn.” 1

Bribery of foreign officials by American businesses is a serious enough
problem that Congress criminalized it in 1977 with the passage of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2 (FCPA). Enforcement of the FCPA has
been on the rise in recent years, as have the penalties.3 Despite the
dramatic escalation in fines and imprisonment for the violations,4 a
particularly potent sanction to combat overseas bribery remains unused; that
is, debarment of the firm from future contracts with the United States.5
Many of the firms caught bribing foreign government officials have

1. Proverbs 17:8 (NIV).
2. See Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1
to -3 (2006)).
3. See, e.g., Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449–51 (2008).
4. See id.
5. The FCPA does not mention debarment as a sanction; instead, it is available under
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR 9.406-5 (2010). Federal prosecutors
maintain that an FCPA violation may result in a company’s suspension or debarment from
future government contracts. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO
QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY at 45 (May 3, 2010)
[hereinafter RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3]. Such a
penalty would have a significant impact on a company’s bottom line, particularly if the
company deals in national defense, oil services, or any other industry that largely relies on
government business to stay afloat. From a law and economics perspective, the threat of
debarment is perhaps one of the best ways to deter these companies from committing FCPA
violations.
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extensive contracts with a number of domestic federal agencies,6 meaning
debarment would be a particularly devastating punishment. Therefore, the
threat of debarment, even for the standard two-year period, would serve as a
singularly effective deterrent against such corruption; firms can recover and
rebound from a large fine much more easily than from a loss of all
government contracts, even for a limited time.
Even so, the federal agencies enforcing the FCPA—the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—have
avoided exposing certain companies to potential debarment in even the
most egregious cases of foreign corruption, citing concern for the
“collateral consequences” that might result from a debarred company’s
collapse. This raises the question: are certain government contractors too
big to debar? As this Article demonstrates, it appears so. Consequently,
the handful of private entities responsible for satisfying the vast majority of
outsourced United States contracts have enjoyed bailouts from agency
officials who refuse to sanction corrupt practices through suspension or
debarment. This situation leads to the jaded viewpoint that paying fines
when caught bribing foreign officials “simply become[s] a cost of doing
business.” 7
As discussed in Part I, not only does this practice deepen our nation’s
entanglement with those who are undermining fledgling democracies
overseas, agencies that continue to award billions of dollars in federal
funding to contractors prosecuted for peddling bribes abroad send mixed
messages about the United States’ commitment to accountability and
transparency in foreign markets. The government’s failure to sever its
partnership with a company after exposing egregious acts of foreign
corruption undermines our nation’s credibility as a beacon of best practices
to the increasingly global marketplace. From a less altruistic perspective,
with zero risk of debarment and minimal risk of detection, companies have
little incentive to comply with the FCPA when the fines imposed make up a
fraction of the profit generated from foreign business procured through
bribery. Without the realistic threat of debarment, companies partnering
with the United States have little incentive to withdraw from the black
market of foreign bribery.
To help illuminate these concerns, Part II of this Article will examine the
third largest 8 FCPA-related 9 enforcement action to date, the BAE Systems
6. 95.2 percent of BAE Systems’ revenue in 2009 came from defense-related contracts.
Defense News Top 100 for 2009, DEFENSE NEWS (June 28, 2010),
http://defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2009.php?c=FEA&s=T1C.
7. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 430
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) (response of John C.
Keeney, Deputy Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, DOJ, to written questions of Sen. Alfonse
D’Amato).
8. Siemens holds the number one spot of the top FCPA prosecutions based on fines and
penalties. In 2008, the company pleaded guilty and paid a fine of roughly $800 million for
paying bribes across the world. The second largest FCPA prosecution involved Kellogg
Brown & Root (KBR), which, along with its former corporate parent Halliburton, paid $579
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case. On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems PLC paid approximately $400
million in fines for its corrupt practices abroad. 10 Nevertheless, within a
year, BAE won federal contracts in excess of $6 billion. 11 Evidence
suggests that this is not an isolated coincidence. 12 Yet this practice has
gone largely unnoticed by the academic literature on the FCPA.
Part III helps frame the debarment debate by first revealing why fines are
largely inconsistent with the United States’ stated goal of rooting out
corruption in foreign markets. This part then canvasses the law of
suspension and debarment, and explains how these potent penalties are
often the functional equivalent of sentencing a corporation to death. After
explaining the benefits that may flow from an agency’s increased use of
discretionary suspension and debarment (namely, its deterrent effect on
foreign corruption), Part III considers the collateral consequences of
sanctioning FCPA violations in such a harsh manner.
After reviewing the Overseas Contractor Reform Act and teasing out the
competing interests at stake—deterring foreign corruption while avoiding
the collateral consequences of severely sanctioning corrupt contractors too
big to debar—this Article concludes that the United States must begin to
diversify its portfolio of federal contractors so that prosecutors may
leverage the legitimate threat of debarment to deter foreign corruption more

million in connection with bribes paid to undercover agents posing as Nigerian officials. See
Leslie Benton et al., Anti-Corruption, 45 INT’L LAW. 345, 347 (2011); Bruce Hinchey,
Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and
Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 406–07 (2011); Jon Jordan, Recent
Developments in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the New UK Bribery Act: A Global
Trend Towards Greater Accountability in the Prevention of Foreign Bribery, 7 N.Y.U. J. L.
& BUS. 845, 855–56 (2011).
9. As discussed below, BAE was technically not prosecuted for violating the FCPA;
rather, its acts of bribery were prosecuted under the more general 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006)
for submitting false statements by misrepresenting the nature of its bribe payments to the
government. See infra Part III.
10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html. According to the DOJ’s press release, BAE Systems
PLC “is a multinational defense contractor with headquarters in the United Kingdom and
with a U.S. subsidiary—BAE Systems Inc.—headquartered in Rockville, Md. None of the
criminal conduct described in the plea involved the actions of BAE Systems Inc.” Id.
11. See Prime Award Spending Data for BAE Systems PLC, Fiscal Year 2010,
USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?fromfiscal=yes&fiscal_year=2011
&contractorid=243604&fiscal_year=2010&tab=By+Prime+Awardee&fromfiscal=yes&carr
yfilters=on&Submit=Go (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (reporting that U.S. agencies awarded
BAE $6,619,991,720 in “prime awards” during the fiscal year 2010 in 13,238 transactions).
As of August 31, 2011, domestic government agencies have awarded BAE $3,663,155,093
in “prime award” contracts in 7,825 transactions. Prime Award Data for BAE Systems PLC,
Fiscal Year 2011, USASPENDING.GOV, http://www.usaspending.gov/explore?fromfiscal=
yes&fiscal_year=2010&contractorid=243604&fiscal_year=2011&tab=By+Prime+Awardee
&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&Submit=Go (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
12. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, The Paper Tiger Stirs: Rethinking Suspension and
Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 211, 214 (2004) (“With fewer major, critical
contractors available to compete for the Government’s most sophisticated requirements, it
seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future competition. Such behaviour might be
described as cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face.”).
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effectively. In short, by rewarding subsequent lucrative contracts to firms
fined for engaging in foreign corruption, the United States reinforces the
perception that bribery brings success, as observed in the quote above from
the book of Proverbs. The only way to change this perception, and in turn
purify foreign markets polluted by corruption, is to end the government’s
subsidization of companies that carry out United States business in a
corrupt manner.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Dark Side of Foreign Corruption
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” 13

The cancerous effect of corruption abroad can quickly spread through the
increasingly global marketplace and ultimately wreak havoc on the
economy at home. 14 During a 2010 speech, Assistant Attorney General
Lanny Breuer pointed to the estimated $1 trillion in worldwide bribes paid
each year 15 as evidence of just how severely such foreign corruption
“undermines the health of international markets [by] stifling competition
and repelling foreign investment.” 16 In emerging economies, Breuer
further explained that the routine bribery of officials means that “[r]oads are
not built, schools lie in ruin, and basic public services go unprovided.”17
There are several other toxic side effects of foreign bribery, such as its
subsidization of terrorism and brutal tyrants. Companies that routinely
engage in corrupt business practices abroad play an active role in helping
maintain the “ungoverned states” that “continue to export poverty and serve
as havens for all sorts of gangsters, pirates, and terrorists.” 18 For example,
investigators revealed that Siemens’ indiscriminate use of its “web of secret

13. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
14. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 268 (7th ed. 2007)
(“How destructive, economically, is corruption . . . ? Perhaps very, because the heaviest
burden falls on innovation.” (citing Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly
to Growth?, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 409, 412–13 (1993))).
15. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the United Nations for International
Anti-corruption Day (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crmspeech-101209.html [hereinafter Anti-corruption Day Speech]; see also Susan RoseAckerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 301, 301
(Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2004).
16. Anti-corruption Day Speech, supra note 15; see also Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and
Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441 (2010) (“Bribery inhibits economic growth by two
primary mechanisms: economic inefficiency and reduced investment.”).
17. Anti-corruption Day Speech, supra note 15.
18. Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 129, 131 (2010); see also Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the 3rd
Russia & Commonwealth of Independent States Summit on Anti-corruption (Mar. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110316.html
(“[C]orruption is a ‘gateway crime,’ allowing money laundering, gang violence, terrorism
and other crimes to thrive.”).
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bank accounts and shadowy consultants” to secure government contracts
abroad resulted in “$1.7 million to Saddam Hussein and his cronies.”19
The Executive Branch has similarly identified foreign bribery as a threat
to national security. As part of his post-9/11 foreign policy, President
George W. Bush acknowledged corruption’s “serious adverse effects
on . . . the security of the United States against transnational crime and
terrorism.” 20 The Obama Administration has similarly “recogni[zed] that
pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights and a severe
impediment to development and global security.” 21
In addition to its destructive economic consequences and links to
terrorism, the spread of foreign corruption has produced several other side
effects worth mentioning. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that
goods and services procured through corruption are more likely to be at
best, defective, and at worst, deadly. 22 Likewise, businesses that resort to
bribery abroad are more likely to bring the practice home. 23 For those
concerned about nurturing democracy and free markets in developing
countries, American companies that bribe foreign officials also undermine
confidence in open governance and open markets.24
B. Theories of Deterrence
Given the dire consequences associated with the spread of corruption in
foreign lands, it is no surprise that central to the DOJ’s mission of “rooting

19. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at C1.
20. Proclamation No. 7750, To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Nonimmigrants of
Persons Engaged in or Benefiting from Corruption, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 12, 2004).
21. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf;
see also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091107.html (“President Obama has
said, ‘The struggle against corruption is one of the great struggles of our time.’”).
22. See, e.g., Nicholas Ambraseys & Roger Bilham, Corruption Kills, 469 NATURE 153,
153–55 (2011); Testimony of POGO’s Danielle Brian on “Contractor Debarment and
Suspension: A Broken System,” Before the George Washington Law School, PROJECT ON
GOV’T
OVERSIGHT
(POGO)
(Nov.
20,
2003),
http://www.pogo.org/pogofiles/testimony/contract-oversight/co-fcm-20031120.html (“Why is it that the government
continues to do the bulk of its business with companies that have . . . knowingly supplied
defective helicopter parts to the government, that have resulted in the deaths of service men
and women; or falsified tests on the cruise missile?”).
23. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 18, at 140 (“German observers have also expressed
support because of concerns that German firms engaged in corruption abroad may have
brought the practices home, i.e., that ‘globalization has become a motor for corruption in
Germany.’” (citing Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising Tide of Corporate
Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at C1)).
24. See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Michael S.
Diamant et al., Corruption Crackdown: The FCPA and Recent Enforcement Trends,
Presentation at Global Economic Crime Survey & Anti-Corruption/FCPA Seminar,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Diamant-FCPAandRecent
EnforcementTrends.pdf.
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out foreign bribery” 25 is its ability to send “a very strong deterrent
message” 26 with each prosecution. In analyzing the deterrent effect of a
given law, the traditional law and economics model operates on the basic
assumption that people generally take calculative steps to advance their own
self-interest. 27 Working from this assumption, Judge Richard Posner, “a
veritable patriarch of deterrence theory,” 28 has stated, “The
primary . . . function of law, in an economic perspective, is to alter
incentives.” 29
Within this framework, a corporate executive, manager, or agent has a
rational incentive to pay bribes overseas where the anticipated pecuniary
benefits exceed the anticipated costs of criminal punishment. 30 The
expected pecuniary benefit to a corporation that engages in bribery is, of
course, the profit it generates with the government contracts procured
through its corrupt practices. At the individual level, an employee’s
willingness to pay an occasional bribe or kickback to grease their supply
chain or win a lucrative contract for their company may be quite tempting
given the variety of benefits that may result: a promotion, a raise, a bonus,
etc.
On the other side of this equation, Judge Posner identifies two key
mechanisms for controlling the expected costs of criminal punishment—the
amount of law enforcement activity and the severity of punishment.31
Bribe payers, just like any other class of criminals, respond to incentives
and perceived opportunity costs, which include punishments and the
probability of getting caught.
The DOJ and SEC have successfully increased their ability to detect
foreign bribery, 32 and have been equally effective at levying massive fines
Even so, it undermines the
to punish such corrupt practices. 33
government’s ability to deter continued corruption when one of the

25. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Address at the 24th National Conference on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
26. Skip Kaltenheuser, Anti-corruption–US Leads the Way, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21F61C45-0318-41F6-89F83E8C01EC57B1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (quoting then-head of enforcement of the DOJ,
Mark Mendelsohn).
27. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 4 (“[M]an is a rational utility maximizer in all areas of
life.”); Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1535, 1544–45 (2005) (“The traditional economic model assumes that people
maximize their self-interest . . . .”).
28. Stevenson, supra note 27, at 1552.
29. POSNER, supra note 14, at 266.
30. Id. at 219; see also David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing
Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 506 (2009) (“A
perfectly deterrent punishment scheme would set the level of punishment at the level of the
expected gains of participating in the criminal behavior.”).
31. POSNER, supra note 14, at 219.
32. See infra Part I.C.2.
33. See infra Part I.C.2.
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potential costs of engaging in such corruption—a company’s suspension or
debarment from partnering with the United States—is never at issue. 34
C. Enforcement of the FCPA
The DOJ maintains that FCPA enforcement helps eliminate foreign
corruption where it already exists, and deters it from taking root in new
situations. 35 Indeed, the DOJ has succeeded impressively in ratcheting up
enforcement in recent years. 36 Executives reportedly spend sleepless nights
wondering if their company will be the next target of an FCPA enforcement
action. 37 On display in the DOJ and SEC’s ever-expanding FCPA trophy
case are such blue-chip staples as General Electric, KBR/Halliburton, and
Tyson Foods. 38
1. Enforcement Authorities
The DOJ, responsible for prosecuting criminal violations of the FCPA,39
and the SEC, responsible for prosecuting civil violations of the FCPA,40

34. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
54, 66 (2010) (prepared statement of Professor Mike Koehler) [hereinafter Koehler
Statement]. In his prepared statement delivered before Senator Arlen Specter and other
members of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Koehler wrote,
Deterrence is not achieved . . . when U.S. government agencies continue to
award multi-million dollar contracts to companies in the immediate aftermath of
bribery scandals.
In order for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be completely heard and
understood egregious instances of corporate bribery that legitimately satisfy the
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation involving high-level executives and/or
board participation should be followed with debarment proceedings against the
offender.
Id.
35. Breuer, supra note 25.
36. See infra Part I.C.2.
37. See Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (May 28, 2010, 10:20 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortionmendelsohn-bribery-racket.html (quoting Lucinda Low, an FCPA specialist as saying,
“[T]he scope of things companies have to worry about is enlarging all the time as the
government asserts violations in circumstances where it’s unclear if they would prevail in
court.”).
38. See SEC v. General Electric Co., No. 1:10-CV-01258 (D.D.C. 2010); SEC v.
Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-cv-399 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root
LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Halliburton Co., 4:09-CV-399 (S.D.
Tex. 2009); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Tyson Foods Inc., No. 1:11cr-00037 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2011).
39. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
2, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2011) (“The Department of Justice is responsible for all criminal enforcement and for
civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to domestic concerns and
foreign companies and nationals.”); see also Thomas, supra note 16, at 444 n.27 (“Though
not precluded by statute, the DOJ does not enforce the accounting provisions often, if
ever.”).
40. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 39, at 2 (“The SEC is responsible for civil
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers.”); see also Thomas, supra
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together with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), form the trifecta of
federal agencies tasked with investigating and enforcing the FCPA. Each
agency publicizes its stance on rooting out foreign corruption.41
2. Growth in FCPA Enforcement
Congress has poured millions of dollars into these agencies to help fund
their ambitious anticorruption initiatives. Some commentators have
observed that, in recent years, the DOJ has “substantially enlarged its
efforts to enforce corrupt practices law” 42 by initiating “discussions with
the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division about
partnering with [the DOJ] on FCPA cases,” in addition to “pursuing
strategic partnerships with certain U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout the
United States where there are a concentration of FCPA investigations.”43
In 2007, the FBI created a new unit dedicated solely to handling FCPA
probes. 44 The SEC similarly stepped up its enforcement efforts in 2009 by
creating a special FCPA unit that “focus[es] on new and proactive
approaches to identifying violations” by “being more proactive in
investigations, working more closely with [its] foreign counterparts, and
taking a more global approach to these violations.”45
The robust growth of FCPA-focused units within these agencies has
unsurprisingly translated into robust enforcement of the FCPA. Following
an initial flurry of activity immediately after its enactment in 1977, the
FCPA faded into relative obscurity for a quarter century, generating a mere
sixty corporate cases 46 and no more than $35.2 million in total fines during
note 16, at 444 n.27 (“The SEC has typically been the safeguard of the accounting
provisions, using civil actions such as injunctions to enforce the Act when the DOJ might not
be able to bring criminal charges under the anti-bribery provisions.”).
41. See, e.g., Alice S. Fisher, Asst. Att’y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American Bar
Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPA
Speech.pdf (“At the outset, let me address the most basic questions some of you might have
about the government’s attitude toward FCPA enforcement. Do we care about the FCPA?
Is the FCPA relevant in today’s global business climate? Is enforcing the FCPA a high
priority? The answer to all of those questions is yes. Prosecuting corruption of all kinds is a
high priority for the Justice Department and for me as head of the Criminal Division.”);
Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Washington
Metropolitan
Area
Corporate
Counsel
(Jan.
26,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html (“As an initial
matter, in the Criminal Division we have dramatically increased our enforcement of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in recent years.”).
42. Carrington, supra note 18, at 136.
43. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the 22nd National Forum on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches-testimony/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
44. Sue Reisinger, Why Are More Companies Self-Reporting Overseas Bribes?,
LAW.COM (July 16, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005486003.
45. Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the New York
City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm.
46. John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 18, 2007, 5:05 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/.
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that period. 47 The number of FCPA enforcement actions increased
modestly from 2004 (five) to 2005 (twelve), and then again in 2006
(fifteen). 48 Beginning in 2007, however, the DOJ and SEC brought thirtyeight enforcement actions in a single year 49—a 153 percent increase from
the previous year. This trend held steady in 2008 and 2009, with thirtythree and forty enforcement actions, respectively. 50
The DOJ’s then-chief FCPA prosecutor, Mark Mendelsohn, stated his
desire for the Department to sustain its rapidly increasing enforcement
actions. 51 With an estimated $644 million in FCPA-related sanctions
imposed by the United States in 2009,52 a total of forty enforcement actions
brought by the DOJ and SEC in 2010, 53 and numerous ongoing
investigations, 54 the DOJ has adhered to Mendelsohn’s vision, although he
has left the DOJ for private practice. The explosion of enforcement of the
FCPA in recent years has allowed federal prosecutors to squeeze vast sums
of wealth out of companies prosecuted under the Act. Congress’s
investment in anticorruption enforcement appears to have “abundantly
reimbursed the national treasury” 55 and produced a significant “return on
investment.” 56 With backing from the Obama Administration,57 the
continued climb in the number of FCPA-related investigations and
enforcement actions shows no signs of slowing in 2012 and beyond.

47. Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 103 (2010). The number of FCPA actions during its first
twenty to twenty-five years varies slightly by author. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 16, at
449 (“Twenty years after the FCPA’s passage, only seventeen companies and thirty-three
individuals faced prosecution.”). Despite disagreement over the number of FCPA
prosecutions during this period, it is clear that “[d]uring the first two decades of the FCPA,
enforcement was ‘sporadic’ at best.” Id. at 448.
48. See 2010 Mid-year FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 8, 2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP.
CRIME REP. 36(1) (2008).
52. John E. Kelly et al., White Collar Crime: FCPA Enforcement Update, 34 CHAMPION
56, 56 (2010).
53. 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
54. See id. For more discussion of FCPA investigations earlier in the decade, see
Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–3 (2006) (highlighting
prosecutions from 2002–05).
55. Carrington, supra note 18, at 136.
56. Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing
Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Protecting American Taxpayers] (statement of Sen.
Franken) (“I just want to ask something about return on investment . . . . For every dollar
invested in [healthcare procurement fraud] investigations, we get back $17. And what I’m
wondering is would you like more resources, and can they be used . . . [to] reduc[e] our
deficit by spending more money . . . .”).
57. See Holder, supra note 21.
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3. Dearth of Case Law
The DOJ and SEC have posted a record-breaking number of FCPA
prosecutions in recent years, and have extracted vast sums of wealth from
companies across the globe, yet courts have played a very small role in the
FCPA’s substantive expansion.
Although individuals faced with
incarceration have been less reluctant to challenge FCPA enforcement
actions in court, fearing the negative publicity that might result from an
FCPA trial, most companies have chosen to sweep charges under the rug by
entering into a plea agreement. And prosecutors have been more than
willing to plea bargain with multinational firms willing to accept massive
fines to move on. As a result, “no business entity has publicly challenged
either enforcement agency in an FCPA case in the last twenty years.” 58
4. Trends
The combination of robust enforcement and minimal judicial oversight
has produced a number of trends unique to the FCPA. The first major trend
to emerge in recent years is the DOJ’s increased criminal prosecution of
individuals. 59 Prosecutors have focused particular attention on corporate
executives and high-level managers who fail to instill a culture that
encourages transparency and compliance. 60 Moreover, although the FCPA
has not typically reached individuals on the receiving end of a bribe, the
DOJ has nevertheless deployed a variety of untested tactics to “target
‘foreign official’ recipients of bribe payments.” 61
Several distinct trends have emerged in the prosecution of commercial
entities as well. Prosecutors have imposed vicarious liability on parent
companies for the corrupt practices of their subsidiaries.62 The DOJ has
also stepped up its prosecution of foreign entities, 63 which conveniently
avoids the political backlash that often accompanies corruption charges
brought against domestic employers. That said, domestic corporations have
certainly not been immune from prosecution under the FCPA. The DOJ,
SEC, and FBI have increasingly focused on using “industry-wide sweeps”
to prosecute FCPA violations efficiently, a practice in which “no industry is
immune from investigation.” 64 Specifically, prosecutors have targeted the

58. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade
of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 406 (2010).
59. See id.
60. See Colleen A. Conry, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the
Global Healthcare Industry, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 1 (2010).
61. Koehler, supra note 58, at 405.
62. See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action: Evaluating
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 296 (2007).
63. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 460.
64. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding
Companies for Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm.
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tobacco, telecommunications, healthcare, and defense industries. 65 A
related development in recent FCPA enforcement involved the “landmark
SHOT Show sting operation” in which hundreds of federal agents
descended on a Las Vegas trade convention to serve warrants to industry
participants suspected of paying bribes to “FBI agents posing as
representatives of the Gabonese Ministry of Defense.” 66
In addition to the increased criminal prosecution of individuals,
aggressive enforcement against entities, and industry-wide investigations,
much of the FCPA’s success (or notoriety) is attributable to the growing
number of companies that voluntarily disclose potential violations. The
DOJ and SEC, realizing the incentive-altering force of massive sanctions,
have parlayed a handful of highly publicized multi-million dollar
prosecutions into many more self-disclosures by companies hoping for
more lenient sentencing. 67 As one author pointed out, “The best evidence
that the DOJ’s current enforcement of the FCPA deters bribery is in the
sheer numbers of self-disclosers in recent years.” 68
D. Legislative History
The FCPA has a rather peculiar genesis. Ironically, the issue of
international corruption was first thrust into the spotlight not because of
events abroad, but rather events at home—the Watergate scandal. The year
was 1973 and Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox had requested
that companies involved in President Nixon’s reelection campaign come
forward and admit their illicit dealings.69 The response from Corporate
America exposed not only the rampant corruption that led to President
Nixon’s resignation, but also the international market for black money. 70
Understandably concerned about the pervasive international corruption
brought to light during Watergate, the SEC initiated what was perhaps the
first action against foreign corrupt practices in 1975,71 as well as the first

65. See generally 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 53, at 10–20 (describing
efforts against these industries specifically).
66. Id. at 15.
67. See Bixby, supra note 47, at 115.
68. Thomas, supra note 16, at 467; see also Weiss, supra note 30, at 483.
69. See André M. Peñalver, Note, Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater Problem and
the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 469 (2010).
70. See id. (reporting that inquiries by federal investigators of the Watergate scandal
uncovered a “series of foreign bribery scandals by a number of Fortune 500 companies”).
71. See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 349 (2000). One historical account describes these actions as
follows:
[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission . . . initiated its own investigations,
and in 1975 it moved against four major companies: Gulf Oil Corporation,
Phillips Petroleum Company, Northrop Corporation, and Ashland Oil, Inc. The
SEC alleged that the establishment of secret slush funds for unaccountable
distribution of moneys abroad violated U.S. securities law requiring that public
companies file accurate financial statements.
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voluntary disclosure program for unreported foreign bribes. 72 Shortly
thereafter, Congress set out to assess the seriousness of foreign
corruption. 73 What it uncovered has been described as “the most extensive
documentation of business-government corruption ever produced in
history.” 74
In 1976, Senator William Proxmire introduced Senate Bill 3313 and
persuaded Congress of the need to enact what would become a “pioneering
statute at the time” because it was “the first ever domestic statute governing
the conduct of domestic companies in their interactions . . . with foreign
government officials in foreign markets.”75 In rejecting President Ford’s
more lenient proposal 76 in favor of legislation that criminalized both the
failure to report bribery and the act itself, 77 Congress expressed its belief
that the cost of getting caught bribing foreign officials must be high,
otherwise “many companies will continue paying bribes if they can get
away with it, because the potential rewards are so great and the risks are
minimal.” 78
In drafting the FCPA, Congress wrestled with several difficult questions
concerning the scope of its new statute. Three questions garnered
particularly vigorous debate. The first was whether a requirement that a
company fully disclose its corrupt dealings with foreign officials could
backfire and hurt the United States’ diplomatic relations (Congress decided
full disclosure was more important). 79 The second was whether stopping
the flow of bribe money abroad would hurt United States relations with
allied nations where bribery was customary (Congress dismissed this
concern by pointing out that most foreign countries prohibit bribery despite
local custom). 80 Finally, debate centered on whether the FCPA would
Id. (citing The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 2 (1975)
[hereinafter Multinational Corporations Hearings]).
72. Id. at 350.
73. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Multinational Corps. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93rd Cong. 5
(1975).
74. Posadas, supra note 71, at 350. Posadas’s article provides a comprehensive list of
sources that report the FCPA’s legislative history from 1975–77. See id. at 350 n.10.
75. Koehler Statement, supra note 34, at 2.
76. See Message from the President of the United States, Foreign Payments Disclosure
Act, H.R. Doc. No. 94-572, at 1 (1976). The Ford Administration’s proposed bill required
that companies report “certain classes for foreign payments made by U.S. corporations (only
significantly large payments), but would not make these payments unlawful as long as they
complied with other existing applicable law. This was a conservative approach.” Posadas,
supra note 71, at 356.
77. See Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings on H.R. 15481 and S. 3664 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong. (1976).
78. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1976) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
79. See Multinational Corporations Hearings, supra note 71, at 22; see also Posadas,
supra note 71, at 358.
80. See Multinational Corporations Hearings, supra note 71, at 24; see also Posadas,
supra note 71, at 358.
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place American businesses at a serious disadvantage by prohibiting a
practice that foreign companies were still free to engage in 81 (Congress
rejected this too, opting to force American companies to take the high road
instead). 82
After resolving the remaining points of contention and carving out an
exception for “grease payments,” 83 Senate Bill 305 passed in both houses84
and President Carter signed it into law on December 19, 1977. 85 This was
the birth of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. With the exception of a
proposed amendment to quell concerns that the FCPA was overburdening
American businesses, 86 the decade that followed was uneventful.
In 1988, concern over the FCPA’s chilling effect on American
companies’ willingness to pursue opportunities abroad resurfaced,
ultimately leading to the first of two amendments to the FCPA. 87 Although
the amendment left the FCPA’s two-prong structure intact, 88 it created two
affirmative defenses and elevated the grease payment exception from the
accounting prong to its present position as a stand-alone exception. 89 The
amendment created one affirmative defense for promotion or hospitality
expenses, 90 and a second affirmative defense for bribes made pursuant to
written law of the country in which the bribe was paid.91

81. See Posadas, supra note 71, at 358. Congress did make some concessions, however,
carving out an exception for “so-called ‘grease’ payments such as payments for expediting
shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call, securing required
permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the
proper performance of duties.” S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 (1977).
82. See Posadas, supra note 71, at 358 (“[I]t appears that Congress ultimately adopted
sanctions because it simply considered the practice to be wrong.”).
83. See S. Rep. No. 95-114; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-640 (discussing the legislative
history behind the “grease payments” exception).
84. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-831 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 38,599, 38,779 (1977).
85. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to dd-2 (2006)).
86. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on
S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 1 (1981). The Senate joint
hearings on the proposed amendment focused on “whether the [FCPA], including both its
antibribery and accounting provisions, [was] the best approach [to deterring foreign
corruption], or whether it has created unnecessary costs and burdens out of proportion to the
purposes for which it was enacted, and whether it serves our national interest.” Id. (statement
of Sen. D’Amato). Senator John Chafee echoed these concerns: “We’ve learned that the
best of intentions can go awry and create confusion and great cost to our economy.” Id. at 8.
87. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. I, §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415–25.
88. See infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the FCPA’s two-prong
structure); see also Otto G. Obermaier & Robert G. Morvillo, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, in 2 WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 16.04 (Robert J.
Anello et al. eds., 1990).
89. See §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. at 1415–25.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 916–
20 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
90. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).
91. See infra Part I.E.
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As globalization spread, 1988 was also an important year because it
marked a “renewed awareness of international criminal activity” that would
ultimately allow international “anti-corruption initiatives [to] flourish.”92
In the years that followed, countries around the world joined (or at least
claimed to join) the United States in its global war on corruption.93 In
1997, thirty-two other nations joined the United States in signing the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on
Combating Bribery (OECD Convention) whereby each nation pledged to
criminalize foreign bribery in its home country. 94
One year later, in satisfaction of one of the United States’ obligations
under the OECD Convention, President Clinton amended the FCPA for a
second time by signing into law the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
This
Competition Act of 1998 (International Anti-Bribery Act). 95
amendment significantly expanded both the substantive and jurisdictional
scope of the ever-growing statute. 96 Although the DOJ has subsequently
stretched the scope of the FCPA through a number of novel, untested
theories of prosecution, 97 the International Anti-Bribery Act marks the last
legislative expansion of the FCPA to date.
E. The Provisions of the FCPA
The FCPA has two main prongs: an anti-bribery prong and an
accounting prong. The FCPA’s anti-bribery prong prohibits employees and
agents of a company 98 from giving or offering cash, or anything else of
value, to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain business.99 The
FCPA’s accounting prong applies to a company (and its employees and
92. Posadas, supra note 71, at 370.
93. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding
the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425,
453 (2009) (describing numerous multilateral efforts to combat global corruption).
94. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
95. Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to
-3, 78ff (2006)).
96. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 447–48.
97. See generally Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L.
907, 963–81, 998–1001 (2010).
98. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-2 to -3. “Companies” subject to the FCPA’s
jurisdiction include “U.S. companies (whether public or private) and its [sic] personnel; U.S.
citizens; foreign companies with shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange or otherwise
required to file reports with the SEC; or any person while in U.S. territory.” Koehler, supra
note 97, at 913 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -3).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). The FCPA makes it unlawful
for any domestic concern . . . or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of
such domestic concern . . . to make use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, [or] promise to pay . . . anything of value to . . . any person, while
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official . . . for purposes of . . .
influencing any act or decision of such foreign official . . . in his . . . official
capacity . . . .
Id.
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agents) only if it fits within the definition of an “issuer.” 100 In the context
of foreign bribery, the record-keeping provisions require issuers to maintain
detailed, accurate records of all transactions overseas.101 The internal
control provisions supplement the record-keeping provisions by requiring
that issuers instill a corporate culture of transparency through various antibribery policies and procedures, and holds managers accountable for the
transactions that occur under their supervision. 102 The broadly worded
provisions of the FCPA reach all (1) “issuer[s],” 103 (2) “domestic
concern[s],” 104 and (3) any “person” who otherwise commits an act in
furtherance of bribery while physically present in the United States or a
United States territory. 105
The more potent of the two affirmative defenses available under the
FCPA places reasonable hospitality and promotional expenditures outside
the ambit of “bribes” considered to violate the FCPA. This includes
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that [is] . . . a
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging
expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official, . . . and was
directly related to . . . the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of

100. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8). The FCPA defines an issuer as
any person who issues or proposes to issue any security; except that with respect to
certificates of deposit for securities, voting-trust certificates, or collateral-trust
certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated
investment trust not having a board of directors or of the fixed, restricted
management, or unit type, the term “issuer” means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to
the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such
securities are issued; and except that with respect to equipment-trust certificates or
like securities, the term “issuer” means the person by whom the equipment or
property is, or is to be, used.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (describing the record-keeping and internal
control responsibilities of an issuer). It is worth noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the
books and records and internal control provisions apply only to publicly-held companies
with shares traded on a U.S. exchange—a category which can include numerous foreign
companies with shares traded on a U.S. exchange.” Koehler, supra note 97, at 922 (citing
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company that Bribed
Iranian
Official (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/
06_crm_700.html).
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
102. See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
103. Id. § 78c(a)(8).
104. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
105. Id. § 78dd-3. The Government has argued that presence in the United States is
sufficiently established by e-mails, telephone calls, and transfers through correspondent bank
accounts in U.S. intermediary banks. See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d
869, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We have little trouble identifying a direct effect in the United
States caused by the defendants’ acts. Adler used the United States mails and telephones to
commit bribery in violation of the FCPA as an ‘immediate consequence’ of the defendants’
acts.”); United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). For similar
jurisdictional claims by the government, see also United States v. Turner, 624 F. Supp. 2d
206, 226–230 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Zurich Capital Mkts., Inc. v. Coglianese, 388 F. Supp. 2d
847, 858–59, 866–67 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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products or services; . . . or the execution or performance of a contract
with a foreign government or agency thereof. 106

Hospitality and promotional expenditures that may fall within the scope
of this affirmative defense include: (1) the cost of the foreign official’s
airfare to the United States,107 (2) seminar fees, 108 (3) meals,109 (4)
reasonable lodging, 110 (5) ground transportation, 111 (6) product samples
(presumably of minimal value), 112 (7) entertainment,113 (8) FCPAavoidance training for foreign directors of an overseas business partner,114
(9) certain domestic expenses related to a six-week internship program, 115
and (10) costs related to an “educational and promotional tour” of United
States facilities. 116
The second of the two affirmative defenses under the FCPA immunizes
bribery that would otherwise be prohibited but for its legalization in the
country in which the bribe was made. 117 This affirmative defense does not
cover bribes paid in countries where such corruption is merely customary;
rather, it requires that “the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of
value” be “lawful under the written laws” of the bribe recipient’s
country. 118 Critics claim, however, that this affirmative defense offers
nothing more than a “hollow” Hail Mary, 119 because the large majority of
countries where corruption is prevalent and bribery customary nevertheless
outlaw the practice. Moreover, the defense has been rejected at least once
in federal court. 120
Often referred to as “grease” payments, the FCPA provides a single
exception for bribe-like payments to foreign officials, “the purpose of
which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental

106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).
107. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 85-01 (1985).
108. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 92-01 (1992).
109. See, e.g., id.
110. See, e.g., id.
111. See, e.g., id.
112. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA REVIEW PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 82-01 (1982).
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 93-01 (1993).
115. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 07-02 (2007).
116. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FCPA OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE No. 07-01 (2007).
117. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (2006).
118. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), dd-2(c)(1), dd-3(c)(1) (emphasis added).
119. See Kyle Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1657675; cf. The Law Ain’t Broke, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 18,
2010, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/8/18/the-law-aint-broke.html (arguing
that “[o]ne cannot deduce from the lack of successful uses of statutory defenses at trial the
conclusion that those defenses are meaningless”).
120. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that his bribes were legal under foreign law because the
bribe was disclosed, rendering the crime unprosecutable under the Azerbaijan Criminal
Code).
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action.” 121 The exception allows grease payments to be made for such
routine governmental actions as
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing governmental
papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police protection,
mail pick–up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associated with
contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across
country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading
and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature. 122

This exception does not, however, cover payments related to
discretionary decisions made by foreign officials such as whether to award
new business, continue existing business, or incorporate particular terms of
agreement. 123
F. Sanctions
Federal prosecutors have a wide array of weaponry with which to wage
war on corruption. The arsenal of criminal and civil penalties at the DOJ
and SEC’s disposal in FCPA cases allows prosecutors to apply varying
degrees of force to deter future violations and extract plea agreements for
past violations. 124 Penalties for violating the FCPA generally fall into one
of two categories: economic sanctions or imprisonment.125 When viewed
through the lens of law and economics, “fines and imprisonment are simply
different ways of imposing disutility on violators.”126 Under this view,
“[c]ommercial bribery is a deliberate tort, and one way to deter it is to make
it worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his gain” 127 either by
imposing sanctions on the tortfeasor that make the conduct too costly to
engage in, or imprisoning corrupt individuals.
1. Criminal Sanctions
Individuals criminally prosecuted under the FCPA for willfully bribing
foreign officials face up to five years in prison and/or fines of up to
$100,000 per violation. 128 Defendants face even stiffer penalties under the
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), dd-2(b), dd-3(b).
122. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), dd-2(h)(4)(A), dd-3(f)(4)(A).
123. See Eric Engle, I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends? Understanding the
U.K. Anti-bribery Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 44 INT’L LAW. 1173, 1177 (2010); F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, &
Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 33, 63 (2010).
124. POSNER, supra note 14, at 220 (“[T]he criminal sanction ought to be calibrated to
make the criminal worse off by committing the crime.”).
125. See Matthew Shabat, SEC Regulation of Attorneys Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Decisions on Efficiency and Their Role in International Anti-bribery Efforts,
20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 987, 1000 (1999).
126. Id. at 223.
127. Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2004).
128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), dd-3(e)(2)(A), 78ff(c)(2)(A) (2006).
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FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions, including up to twenty
years in prison and/or fines not to exceed $5 million.129
As business shifts to various emerging foreign markets, prosecutors have
increasingly relied on the threat of imprisonment to deter corporate
executives from engaging in corrupt practices overseas. 130 This is due in
large part to the failure of civil remedies during the 2000s to deter corporate
greed and corruption domestically, which ultimately led to the collapse of
Enron in 2001 and the banking industry in 2008. 131 Prior to 1994, there
were no incarcerations for violations of the FCPA. 132 Following the
financial scandals that exposed corporate corruption in the United States,
incarcerating individuals tendering bribes abroad became rather
Consequently, “[s]ome deterrent effect on corporate
common. 133
misconduct seems to exist now as a result of the recent ‘spectacle of
executives being handcuffed and hauled off to jail.’”134
All sanctions result in some cost to the government that imposes them.
Imprisonment involves the cost of facilities, guards, feeding and clothing
the inmates, etc.; imposing fines involves other costs, like the efforts to
extract the funds. But the revenue from the fines can outweigh those
costs. 135 Imprisonment in the white collar context (usually in nicer
facilities) would seem to be especially costly for the government, making
such a sanction even less appealing when compared to hefty fines and
disgorgement for white collar offenses. Of course, debarment imposes
significant short-term costs on the government as well—perhaps losing a
favorite contractor or vendor—but the benefits debarment offers help offset
these costs in the long term.
When sanctioning entities rather than individuals, organizations charged
with criminal violation of the antibribery provisions may face fines of up to
$2 million per violation. 136 Moreover, an entity’s criminal violation of the
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
130. Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 CORP. CRIME
REP. 3 (2008) (“‘The number of individual prosecutions has risen—and that’s not an
accident,’ Mendelsohn said. ‘That is quite intentional on the part of the Department. It is
our view that to have a credible deterrent effect, people have to go to jail.’”).
131. See generally Nicholas J. Wagoner, Comment, Honest-Services Fraud: The
Supreme Court Defuses the Government’s Weapon of Mass Discretion in Skilling v. United
States, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 1087, 1131–32 (2010) (“A more recent trend, which emerged
during the 2000s, involved the endless string of highly publicized corporate scandals. Most
notably, scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Martha Stewart, options backdating, lobbyist
Jack Abramoff, the mortgage crisis and subsequent bailout, Bernie Madoff, and Goldman
Sachs each left their mark on what Time Magazine characterized as the ‘Decade from
Hell.’”).
132. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 81 (2d ed. 2010).
133. Id.
134. Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
Certification Provisions: A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 435 (2005) (quoting Jonathan Peterson, Corporate Fraud
Cases Decline, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at C1).
135. POSNER, supra note 14, at 223.
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), dd-3(e)(1)(A); 78ff(c)(1)(A)–(2)(A) (2006).
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FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions can lead to a fine of up
to $25 million. 137
2. Civil Sanctions
The DOJ has the power to pursue civil penalties for FCPA violations as
well. Civil actions provide the government with the benefit of a lower
burden of proof, and penalties that have somewhat fewer legal restrictions
than do fines. Nevertheless, the DOJ has traditionally deferred to the SEC
on civil matters.138 The discretion given to SEC officials to determine the
nature of its enforcement action, the type of redress it will seek, and the
severity of sanctions it will impose rivals that of the DOJ.139 As one might
expect, the civil fine settlements obtained by the SEC in disgorgement and
penalties appear to be close to the fine figures reported by the DOJ in
criminal cases. 140
3. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The penalty imposed on a given company for engaging in foreign
corruption is usually the product of a complex matrix of provisions in the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), which formulates a “corporate
sentencing calculus” for prosecutors and courts. 141 This formula is neither
rigid nor precise; 142 rather, it calls for the balancing of a variety of factors
in determining the severity of the sentence. 143 First, the sentencing
137. Id. § 78ff(a).
138. See DEMING, supra note 132, at 75. There are, however, a few instances in which
the DOJ has pursued FCPA violations civilly. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES: PHASE 2, REPORT ON
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 50 (2002), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/1962084.pdf (finding only four cases between 1979–
2002 where the DOJ brought a civil action under the FCPA).
139. See Weiss, supra note 30, at 478 (“[T]he SEC retains a great deal of discretion in
deciding which civil enforcement actions to bring against issuers as well as the appropriate
type of penalties—fines, injunctions, or both—to seek in an action.”).
140. Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay, A Proposal for a United
States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 153, 165–66 (2010). SEC officials tasked with prosecuting foreign corruption
consider the following factors:
egregiousness of conduct, isolated or systemic nature of violations; widespread or
systemic nature of conduct; degree of self-policing; remedial efforts; and the
extent of cooperation with investigation. Additional factors include the degree of
benefit to the company and the harm to others; the level of intent; the need for
deterrence; and whether conduct was difficult to detect.
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at 32.
141. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 161–62.
142. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that sentencing
ranges must be advisory in nature rather than mandatory, preserving federal judges’
sentencing discretion).
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2C1.1, 2B1.1 (2010). Although fines
generally must fall within the range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements give prosecutors the
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guidelines require a “base fine,”144 which, in the case of international
corporate crimes, will most likely be “the pecuniary loss from the offense
caused by the organization, to the extent the loss was caused intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly.” 145
Second, a culpability score must be calculated146 based on factors such as
the extent to which upper level management condoned corrupt behavior,
whether the prosecuted entity has a track record of corruption, whether the
entity helped or hindered the investigation into its corrupt dealings, and the
adequacy of the entity’s compliance program. 147 Third, a culpability range
must be determined by taking the culpability score calculated in the first
two steps and cross-referencing it with the table at USSG section 8C2.6 to
determine the minimum and maximum multiplier. 148 The fine floor and
fine ceiling create a range to help the court determine the appropriate fine.
These calculated penalties are rarely imposed, however, as prosecutors
typically enter into plea agreements with the prosecuted entities before
turning the decision over to a sentencing judge. 149
4. Alternative Fines Act
Prosecutors may strap additional penalties onto the fines calculated under
the federal sentencing guidelines for FCPA violations, which frequently, “in
aggregate, exceed the statutory maximums.” 150 In theory, by increasing the
severity of possible fines under the FCPA, prosecutors similarly enhance
the deterrent force of the law. Under the Alternative Fines Act (AFA), an
entity may be fined up to twice the gross gain resulting from its corrupt
practices. 151 Conversely, when a prosecuted entity’s corruption results in
pecuniary loss to a third party (e.g., where a defendant procures a contract
in exchange for bribes, which would have otherwise been granted to a
competitor), the contractor may face fines of up to twice the gross amount
of the loss. 152 Similarly, individuals may similarly face additional fines of
up to $250,000, or up to twice the gross gain or loss under the AFA. 153

discretion to seek fines “below the bottom of the guidelines range to reflect voluntary
reporting, extensive internal investigation, cooperation, remediation, and similar mitigating
factors.” RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5,
at 31.
144. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(a).
145. Id. § 8C2.4(a)(3).
146. See JULIE O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 210 (3d ed. 2007).
147. See U.S.S.G. §§ 8B2.1(b)(1)–(7), 8C2.5(b)–(e), 8C2.5(f)(1); see also Tarun &
Tomczak, supra note 140, at 162 (citing U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b)–(e)).
148. See O’SULLIVAN, supra note 146, at 213.
149. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 165.
150. Id. at 161.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(a), 3571(d) (2006).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 3571(b), 3571(d).
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5. Confiscation of Bribery and Proceeds of Bribery
a. Civil Disgorgement
The government tries to mulct the accrued benefits of bribery either
through criminal forfeiture (DOJ) or civil disgorgement of profits (SEC).154
The SEC has increasingly sought to disgorge profits from companies that
obtained them by corrupt means. 155 Commentators have questioned the
SEC’s disgorgement authority 156 because the relevant statute does not
expressly authorize this penalty, nor is there support in the FCPA’s
legislative history, 157 and courts have not yet had the opportunity to review
it. 158 Critics of disgorgement argue that, although the penalty theoretically
“can provide perfect deterrence by depriving corporations of the entirety of
the incentive for engaging in illegal bribing,” this is “not necessarily [what
occurs] in practice” 159 given the costly, time-consuming, and politically
delicate nature of following the money trail of profits stashed away in banks
across the world.
b. Civil Forfeiture
The DOJ and SEC have several means by which they may force
companies to forfeit assets linked to the investigation or prosecution of
foreign corruption. For instance, under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act of 2000, 160 any offense listed as an “unlawful activity” in the Money
Laundering Control Act, 161 which includes FCPA violations, may be civilly
forfeited. 162 Similarly, although it rarely exercises its authority to do so,
the DOJ may seize the assets of a company under investigation for foreign
corruption. 163 It has done so on at least two occasions in recent years.164
6. Prohibition from Participating in Public Contracts/Advantages
When deciding which federal contractors to retain, federal agencies must
conduct extensive audits to determine whether a potential private sector

154. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at
33.
155. See Weiss, supra note 30, at 478. Furthermore, “[t]he SEC will often follow a ‘zero
tolerance’ policy in the case of companies that violate both the bribery and record-keeping
provisions, but it has shown more willingness to work with companies that implement
prompt and effective remedial measures.” Id.
156. See e.g., id. at 486, 497; see also Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 165–66.
157. See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1237–38 (2007).
158. Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 166.
159. Weiss, supra note 30, at 506.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006).
161. Id. § 1957.
162. See DEMING, supra note 132, at 82.
163. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at
33.
164. See id. at 18.
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partner will likely comply with foreign corruption laws like the FCPA.165
Companies must have “appropriate internal controls” in order to qualify for
public contracts. 166 Federal contractors can face suspension or debarment
for knowingly withholding disclosure to the government of other contracts
it obtained via “fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations.” 167
II. BAE SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY OF CORRUPTION
The unlikely facts that ultimately led to the prosecution of BAE began to
unfold more than twenty years ago, when Saudi Arabia, a vital ally to the
Western world’s fight against terrorism in the Middle East, placed an order
for approximately 125 Tornado fighter jets manufactured by BAE. With
approximately 100,000 employees serving more than 100 countries,168
BAE Systems is the second largest global defense company. 169 In 2010
alone, it reported sales of over £22.4 billion. 170 With enough capacity and
firepower to meet the Royal Saudi Air Force’s needs, BAE seemed like an
obvious choice for the “Al-Yamamah” arms deal.
Whispers of corruption swirled around the deal from day one. There
were rumors that BAE agents handed wads of cash to Saudi representatives,
and of extravagant “gifts” like a mansion in the United States and a
personal Airbus 340 171 in pursuing the Saudi arms contract. To conceal the
illicit expenses, accountants at BAE invoiced them using cryptic language
such as “support services.” 172
The allegations of bribery ultimately prompted the prosecuting arm of the
United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), to begin investigating
BAE in 2006. The SFO suspected that BAE had used shell companies to
funnel money through Swiss bank accounts to Saudi officials. 173 When the
Saudi prince who was brokering the deal learned of the investigation, he
threatened to take the Al-Yamamah deal to a competing country if the

165. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR
A-133, AUDITS OF STATES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (rev.
2007),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
a133/a133_revised_2007.pdf.
166. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, supra note 5, at
45.
167. Id.
168. Key Facts, BAESYSTEMS.COM, http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/FactSheet/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
169. Defense News Top 100 for 2009, DEFENSE NEWS (June 28, 2010)
http://defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2009.php?c=FEA&s=T1C (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
170. Key Facts, supra note 168.
171. R v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 714, 2008 WL
833707, [8]-[38] (Divisional Court’s Judgment); see also R v. Director of the Serious Fraud
Office, [2008] UKHL 60; Interview with David Leigh, Frontline: Black Money, PBS (Sept.
13, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney/interviews/leigh.html.
172. Complaint at ¶ 43, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035-JDB (D.D.C. Feb.
4, 2010).
173. See Ashish S. Joshi, Britain’s Fight Against the “Silver Lance”: A Radical
Overhaul of the U.K.’s Bribery Law, 33 CHAMPION 36, 37 (2009).
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investigation continued. 174 When this did not work, Saudi officials and
their political allies pressured the director of the SFO with threats of cutting
off the steady stream of military intelligence it was supplying to the U.K.,
placing “British lives on British streets . . . at risk.” 175
London’s 7/7 bombings were still fresh in people’s memories when
Prime Minister Tony Blair convinced the SFO to drop its investigation of
Following this
BAE, citing concerns for national security. 176
announcement, the U.K. “won” a contract from the Saudi Arabian
government for seventy-two Typhoon jet fighters worth $8 billion.177
When questioned at the G8 Summit about his decision to suspend the
investigation of BAE, Prime Minister Blair asserted:
[L]et me make one thing very clear to you—I don’t believe the
investigation, incidentally, would have led anywhere except to the
complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship for our country in
terms of fighting terrorism, in terms of the Middle East, in terms of
British interests there, quite apart from the fact that we would have lost
thousands, thousands of British jobs. 178

In 2001, when questioned about his role in Saudi corruption, Prince Bandar
was equally unapologetic.179
But BAE’s troubles were not over. When its CEO’s plane touched down
in Houston, Texas on May 13, 2008, federal agents were there to greet him.
In the two years that followed, federal officials unraveled a global network
of bribes and kickbacks, which BAE fed with its multi-million dollar slush
fund that helped it pay off the highest echelons of governments in return for
defense contracts. In February 2010, the DOJ informed the court that it had
discovered that “BAE provided substantial benefits to one [Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia] public official, who was in a position of influence regarding
the KSA Fighter Deals.” 180
In court filings, the DOJ describes BAE’s marketing strategy, in which it
used intermediaries to “purchase . . . travel and accommodations, security
services, real estate, automobiles and personal items” 181 as they courted
Saudi officials who held the purse strings to the Al-Yamamah contract. A
travel agent involved would later explain the lavish lifestyles that BAE
afforded Saudi officials as being one “beyond that of a film star, because
[they have] the diplomatic passport.” 182
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Sue Reisinger, Mission Critical, CORP. COUNSEL, Dec. 2008, at 90.
178. Transcript, Frontline:
Black Money, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/blackmoney/etc/script.html (transcript of PBS television broadcast of Apr. 7, 2009).
179. See id. (quoting the Prince as suggesting that a degree of corruption was acceptable
for the development of Saudi Arabia and asserting, “We did not invent corruption. This has
happened since . . . Adam and Eve . . . . [T]his is human nature.”).
180. Complaint at ¶ 43, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4,
2010).
181. Id. at ¶ 44.
182. Transcript, supra note 178.
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The factual description and charging language used by the government to
describe BAE’s illicit activity “is frequently used by the DOJ in charging
companies with FCPA violations.” 183 Despite the seeming applicability of
the FCPA’s antibribery and reporting provisions, the DOJ instead charged
BAE with conspiracy to make false statements to the United States
government about the nature of its payments—a charge that, unlike the
FCPA, does not trigger an agency’s discretionary debarment authority.184
The United States was able to assert jurisdiction over the British company
because BAE facilitated its crooked operations abroad through agents
working within the borders of the United States. 185
A month later, the DOJ announced BAE’s guilty plea to “mak[ing] false
statements about its [FCPA] compliance program,” in which it agreed to
pay a $400 million criminal fine.186 Though the fine was touted as “one of
the largest criminal fines in the history of DOJ’s ongoing effort to combat
overseas corruption,” 187 the absence of an FCPA charge meant that
debarment was not an option. The government officials nevertheless took
the opportunity to reaffirm their stated commitment to “hold[ing]
accountable companies that impair the operations of the United States
government by lying about their conduct and operations.”188 The Assistant
Director of the FBI’s Washington Field Office echoed these concerns:
“Corporations and individuals who conspire to defeat this basic economic
principle not only cause harm but ultimately shake the public’s confidence
in the entire system.” 189
It appears, however, that the government’s desire to avoid the
inconvenience that would result from an FCPA-related debarment (namely,
having to hire a new contractor) outweighs its concern for maintaining the
public’s confidence in the democratic system. 190 BAE’s indispensible

183. Koehler, supra note 97, at 995.
184. Complaint at ¶ 5, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035 (D.D.C. Feb. 4,
2010). The United States alleged that
[f]rom at least in or about 2000, BAE Systems plc knowingly and willfully
conspired, and agreed, with others known and unknown to the United States, to:
(a) knowingly and willfully impede and impair the lawful government functions of
the United States government, . . . by making certain false, inaccurate and
incomplete statements to the U.S. government . . . thereby defrauding the United
States in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371; and (b) . . .
knowingly and willfully make materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements
or representations; in violation of Title 18, United State Code, Section 1001.
Id. According to the government, the fruits of BAE’s illicit payments included “gains” in
excess of $200 million. Id. ¶ 48.
185. Id. ¶ 44.
186. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to
Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
March/10-crm-209.html.
187. Id.
188. Id. (statement by Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. Gary G. Grindler).
189. Id.
190. Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No.
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). In declining to bring anti-bribery charges against
Siemens, prosecutors cited “[t]he Department’s analysis of collateral consequences [which]
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partnership with American agencies as the “fifth largest provider of defense
materials to the United States government”191 may have helped it dodge a
bullet.
If companies in which “bribery was nothing less than standard operating
procedure” 192 continue to receive preferential treatment because of
partnerships with key United States officials, the deterrent effect of holding
accountable companies that spread lies and corruption across the globe is
stripped away. When companies weigh the benefits against the costs
associated with paying bribes to receive contracts abroad, the government’s
refusal to bring FCPA charges in cases like BAE places a heavy thumb on
the benefits side of the scale. This becomes even more concerning when
the government actually endorses these practices through continued
partnership with untrustworthy contractors that take money out of the
pocket of the American taxpayer and inject it into the foreign market for
black money.
As pointed out by Professor Mike Koehler, the FCPA’s ability to
accomplish its stated goal—to deter foreign corruption—is severely
diminished when the message sent by prosecutors in cases like BAE “is that
certain companies in certain industries, particularly those that sell certain
products to certain customers, are essentially immune from FCPA.”193
Perhaps most concerning, however, is the United States’ continued
partnership with companies that recently admitted to engaging in foreign
corruption. In categorically refusing to seriously consider suspending or
debarring companies that undermine confidence in free markets overseas,
our nation risks eroding the public’s trust in government institutions at
home.
Roughly a year after the FBI and DOJ had uncovered BAE’s lies and
corruption, the United States entered into no fewer than 13,000 contracts
and subcontracts with BAE totaling upwards of $6 billion. 194 When
compared side by side, this $6 billion promised to BAE in the year that
followed its guilty plea makes the $400 million fine imposed on it look less
like a serious effort to root out corruption, and more like a cost of doing
business.
Perhaps even more shocking than the staggering sums of United States
tax dollars shelled out to BAE after the company admitted to bribery and
fraud are the government entities that may be bankrolling such foreign
corruption. For example, just seven months after the FBI lambasted BAE

included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government
contracts” as influencing its decision not to charge Siemens under the FCPA. Id.
191. Sentencing Memorandum at 1, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2010).
192. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined
Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm1105.html.
193. Koehler, supra note 97, at 996.
194. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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for its crooked business practices, 195 the FBI entrusted BAE with a $40
million contract to “provide critical information security safeguards . . . to
ensure the confidentiality and privacy of FBI computer networks in the
United States and around the world.” 196 One need not understand the
intricacies of law and economics to grasp how the FBI’s decision to invite
BAE to serve as the “gatekeeper” for the FBI “in the cyber world”197 sends
the exact opposite message about the government’s tolerance for foreign
corruption.
III. DEBARMENT AS A METHOD OF DETERRING FOREIGN CORRUPTION
A. The Fallacy of Corporate Fines as a Deterrent
Prosecutors at the DOJ and SEC frequently boast of the massive fines
imposed on companies that violate the FCPA as a sign of success.198
Similarly, scholars often point to the increasingly large FCPA-related fines
imposed on companies as evidence of the Act’s “resurgence.”199 Almost
no attention has been given to the deterrent capability of alternative forms
of punishment, however, such as suspension and debarment.
Despite this seemingly singular focus on corporate sanctions, fines offer
little deterrent value in the corporate setting, and in some cases actually
work against the FCPA’s goal of deterring foreign corruption. Fines
provide an ineffective mechanism for deterring white collar crime
committed by corporations because corporations, in essence, have “no soul
to damn [and] no body to kick.” 200
1. Corruption as a Cost of Doing Business
The first popular fallacy is that the threat of a hefty fine deters
corporations from engaging in misconduct much in the same manner as it
would a person. This misses the reality that corporations are nothing more
than a legal fiction; humans, on the other hand, are living, breathing,
feeling, and thinking beings. Whereas a human may experience the painful,
agonizing toll that steep fines have on their quality of life, corporations
cannot be coerced in this manner. Moreover, “deterrence via corporate
sanctions does not halt the individual behaviors of agents and officers

195. See supra note 189.
196. Press Release, BAE Sys., BAE Systems to Provide Cyber Security to FBI in $40
Million Order (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/
2010/autoGen_11082113586.html.
197. Id. (statement by BAE Systems’ Vice President and General Manager of Intelligence
and Security Tom Sechler).
198. See, e.g., Breuer, supra note 25 (stating that the DOJ has “imposed the most criminal
penalties in FCPA-related cases in any single 12-month period—ever. Well over $1
billion.”).
199. See generally Koehler, supra note 58.
200. See generally John Coffee, “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386
(1981).
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within the corporation, who feel peer pressure for profits or sales results
that is greater than their expected norm of ethical and compliant
behavior.” 201
As rational calculators of costs and benefits, “a corporation might employ
a simple cost-benefit analysis in whether to engage in bribery and merely
suffer a large fine.” 202 When viewed from a law and economics
perspective, it is not surprising that less than a decade after its enactment,
debate in Congress centered on whether sanctions for violating the FCPA
would merely be treated as a “cost of doing business.” 203
Under this critique, FCPA fines have little if any deterrent effect when
the benefits derived from the sanctionable conduct—landing massive
overseas contracts by paying off foreign officials without risking the loss of
equally profitable business with the United States—largely outweigh the
cost of getting caught. As one author observed,
Even if it makes sense to threaten profits, legal sanctions have to be
sensitive to the fact that, comparatively, they are of very little significance
to a large corporation. Profits can be increased or undermined from many
more sources:
through personnel policies, competitors’ moves,
investment or not in production and so on. 204

As a result, the question for corporate actors is not “To bribe or not to
bribe?” but rather “How much could this bribe cost the company?”
Unfortunately, fines present a corporation with the opportunity to pay its
way out of an FCPA violation.
2. Mixed Messages Sent by Monetary Sanctions
That FCPA-related fines are perceived merely as costs of doing business
rather than punishment for morally repugnant corruption undermines the
moral message embodied in the legislation. This in turn “undercuts the
[FCPA’s] deterrent force.” 205 In his book Punishment and Modern Society:
A Study in Social Theory, David Garland explains how “penality
communicates meaning not just about crime and punishment but also about
power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social
201. JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIMES: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR
CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 14 (2009) (citing generally Coffee, supra note
200).
202. Thomas, supra note 16, at 467.
203. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearing on S. 430
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. & Monetary Policy and the Subcomm. on Sec. of the
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) (response of John C.
Keeney, Deputy Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., DOJ, to written questions of Sen. D’Amato) .
204. CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 34 (2d ed. 2001).
205. See Eliason Says Shift to Deferred Prosecution Agreements Unduly Favors
Corporations, 22 CORP. CRIME REP. 1 (2008); see also Brent Fisse, Reconstructing
Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1141, 1217 (1983) (“Another inadequacy of fines is that they convey the impression that
permission to commit a crime may be bought for a price. This impression conflicts with the
goals of both deterrence and retribution, which are partly to express the notion that offenses
are socially unwanted and that money alone cannot adequately compensate.”).
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relations, and a host of other tangential matters.”206 Thus, “[f]ines do not
emphatically convey the message that serious corporate offenses are
socially intolerable. Rather they create the impression that corporate crime
is permissible provided the offender merely pays the going price.”207
By tolerating contractors’ corruption through continued patronage,
domestic agencies send the message to contractors that paying bribes and
falsifying reports is an excusable offense so long as a company that gets
caught “can buy [its] way out of criminal liability.” 208 When those who get
caught are making exponentially greater sums of money from government
contracts, including United States contracts, the risk of getting caught
tendering a bribe overseas (especially when discounted by the low
probability of detection) becomes significantly diminished. Moreover, with
the flow of new United States contracts on a regular basis, “[P]aying of
bribes . . . will not [be] tolerated” 209 becomes, “Don’t worry about it, we’ll
deduct it from your next paycheck.” This approach to FCPA enforcement
conflicts with the goals of both deterrence and retribution, which are
partly to express the notion that offenses are socially unwanted and that
money alone cannot adequately compensate. Whatever compensation
victims receive after a harm has occurred, in many cases they would have
been unwilling to prebargain for the harm in return for monetary
compensation. 210

3. Abusive Monetary Sanctions
Controversy surrounds the use of sanctions to punish companies for
unethical behavior, due to the potential for inviting prosecutorial abuse.
Prosecutorial abuse through monetary sanctions in the FCPA context
typically takes one of two forms. First, critics contend that prosecutors
threaten companies with massive unwarranted fines to coerce them into plea
agreements. 211 Other critics take this concern a step further by pointing out
that threats of large fines have helped extract plea agreements even in cases
where the government’s legal theories were questionable.212 The massive

206. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
252 (1990).
207. Brent Fisse, Sentencing Options Against Corporations, 1 CRIM. L.F. 211, 220
(1990); see also WELLS, supra note 204, at 31 (“It is interesting that the word ‘punishment’
is replaced when corporations are the object of criminal enforcement by the altogether less
emotive ‘sanction.’”).
208. Eliason Says Shift to Deferred Prosecution Agreements Unduly Favors
Corporations, supra note 205, at 3; see also Fisse, supra note 205, at 1217 (“Another
inadequacy of fines is that they convey the impression that permission to commit a crime
may be bought for a price.”).
209. Breuer, supra note 43.
210. Fisse, supra note 205, at 1217.
211. See, e.g., DEMING, supra note 132, at 77 (“Given the severity of the criminal penalty
for a violation of the accounting and record-keeping provisions, and a greater ability to prove
a violation, a prosecutor has an enhanced ability to negotiate a plea.”).
212. See Koehler, supra note 97, at 946–55.
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fines and disgorgement of profits imposed under the FCPA may stand on
similarly shaky ground. 213
As discussed throughout this Article, although suspension or debarment
can be far more crippling to a company’s bottom line than the imposition of
a fine, debarment offers an alternative to fines that is less susceptible to
abuse. Settlements or plea bargains usually fall within prosecutorial
discretion, 214 even in corruption cases. If a corporate defendant is riskaverse, officials can use the threat of large fines to induce the firms into
plea bargaining even where the evidence of corruption is relatively thin. As
with other sanctions, suspension and debarment are within the discretion of
the enforcement agencies, so these punishments can become part of the
threats used in plea bargaining with suspected violators. 215
Second, some claim that the typical FCPA-related penalties imposed on
companies facilitate prosecutorial cronyism. Those who endorse this
perspective claim that a look behind the curtain reveals “Bribery Inc.,” in
which a booming industry exists that largely benefits ex-prosecutors who
parlay their DOJ contacts into lucrative gigs as DOJ-appointed monitors
and compliance officers at private corporations under investigation for
foreign corruption. Critics point to the fact that the majority of these
monitors are former DOJ prosecutors. 216
Given the DOJ’s and SEC’s practically unfettered discretion over the
terms of a company’s plea agreement, federal prosecutors may engage in
political patronage by levying massive fines and monitoring fees on a
company, requiring legal fees “to the tune of billions of dollars,” which
trickle down to lawyers, “many with past ties to the U.S. Justice
Department.” 217 The argument continues, “[T]here is nothing to stop
prosecutors from ginning up cases that will feed the lawyers who used to
have their jobs or from looking forward to a payday in the private sector
that will be made possible by their busy successors at Justice.”218
Expressing her “outrage, that people get $50 million to be a monitor,” U.S.
District Court Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle declared the fines, fees, and other
expenses generated by FCPA-related monetary sanctions as having created
a “boondoggle.” 219

213. See id. at 963–84.
214. Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an Overcriminalized Justice
System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569, 1569 (2010).
215. See FAR 9.406-1(a) (2010) (“It is the debarring official’s responsibility to determine
whether debarment is in the Government’s interest.”).
216. See Vardi, supra note 37, at 2 (“It seems that an important qualification for these
gigs is having previously worked at the Justice Department—as 7 of the 13 FCPA monitors
have done.”).
217. Id. at 1.
218. Id.
219. Christopher Matthews, Judge Blasts Compliance Monitors at Innospec Plea
Hearing, MAIN JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/
2010/03/18/judge-blasts-compliance-monitors-at-innospec-plea-hearing/.
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B. The Law of Suspension and Debarment
The Reagan Administration was the first major proponent of using
debarment to deter “government waste, fraud, and exploitation of public
funds in federal programs” and to enhance “governmental
accountability.” 220 Although companies are mandatorily debarred from
contracting with the United States 221 and European Union (EU)222 for
violating certain statutes, 31 U.S.C. § 6101 leaves the decision up to each
agency’s discretion when contractors violate the FCPA. 223
Companies that solicit, procure, or carry out a government contract by
paying bribes, making false statements, or destroying evidence—conduct
that obviously falls within the purview of the FCPA’s antibribery and
accounting provisions—trigger an agency’s discretionary debarment
authority. 224 This power to suspend or debar federal contractors during
criminal FCPA prosecution arises under the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR), which calls for a company’s suspension or debarment for up to three
years, “commensurate with the seriousness of the cause(s).” 225
When agency officials assess the seriousness of the cause, “the contractor
has the burden of demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the debarring official,
its present responsibility, and that debarment is not necessary.” 226 In
reviewing suspension and debarment decisions, courts have similarly taken
into consideration the “mitigating circumstances in order to sustain a
debarment or suspension.” 227
The resulting harm that may occur to a contractor following its
suspension or debarment is magnified by the fact that such decisions are
said to flow down to all other contracting executive agencies.228 In other
words, each agency has the power to blacklist a contractor from conducting
business with any other agency of the United States. This is not without
220. See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 252 (citing Exec. Order No. 12549, 51 Fed.
Reg. 6370 (Feb. 18, 1986) (applying debarment to abuses of federal “grants, cooperative
agreements, contracts of assistance, loans, and loan guarantees,” but not “procurement
programs”)). In 1989, President George H.W. Bush subsequently expanded the utility of
debarment by making an agency’s debarment of a company applicable to all agencies,
government-wide. Executive Order 12689, 54 Fed. Reg. 34131 (Aug. 16, 1989).
221. See, e.g., Generic Drug Enforcement Act, 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a)(2)(B) (2006); Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 § 2, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1368 (2006); Davis Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a–277a-5 (2006); Buy American Act, 41
U.S.C. §§ 10–10d (2006); Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35–45; Service Contract Act of
1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–358; Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. § 701; Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (2006).
222. Council Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 45, 2004 O.J. (L. 134/114), 120–21 (EU).
223. See 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006).
224. FAR 9.406-2(a) (2010).
225. Id. § 9.406-4.
226. Id. § 9.401-(a)(10).
227. W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS ACT
239 (3d ed. 2003) (compiling cases).
228. See FAR 52.212-5; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FIGHTING GLOBAL CORRUPTION:
BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT 28 (2001). Significantly, a company that enters into a nonprosecution agreement or deferred prosecution agreement under the FCPA is still subject to
debarment. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 54, at 36.
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exception, however, as agencies may still pursue business with a blacklisted
contractor so long as the agency produces a written statement from the
agency’s debarment official providing “the compelling reasons” for renewal
or extension of its business with the contractor. 229
C. Suspension and Debarment as a “Corporate Death Sentence”
Commentators have described the severity of a company’s preclusion
from contracting with the government as being a “drastic penalty,”230 a
“virtual ‘death sentence,’” 231 and as effectively “sound[ing] the death
knell” 232 for many companies. This is particularly true when a company’s
bread and butter are bullets and bombs, 233 healthcare, 234 oil and gas, or any
other industry heavily regulated by the United States. Although the FAR’s
purpose was to protect the government rather than punish criminal
contractors, 235 officials resort to it only for the most egregious criminal
violations. 236
D. Benefits of Debarment
1. Increased Compliance Without Increased Enforcement Costs
Given its potency as a penalty, “[f]or large defense contractors,
disbarment from U.S. government contracts could well be the most
significant deterrent to engaging in conduct proscribed under the FCPA.”237
Thus, the heightened degree of severity associated with the risk of
debarment, even when the risk of detection is minimal, will increase
compliance with the FCPA. Penalizing corrupt contractors by suspending
federal funding would more effectively dry up the market for bribe money

229. FAR 9.405-1(b).
230. O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 251.
231. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095,
1134 (2006); see also O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 256 (“The result is the corporate
‘death penalty’ because the pipeline of new product approvals is closed for that entity or that
person, and no further approvals can be made—effectively ending the ability of the company
to remain in that regulated field.”).
232. Charles V. Weinograd, Note, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of
Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine Governmental Action Exception, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 526 n.99 (2010).
233. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
234. See Conry, supra note 60, at 1.
235. See O’REILLY ET AL., supra note 201, at 254.
236. See id. (“Debarment from contracting with the government is an exceptional
remedy.”); see also FAR 9.406-4(a)(1) (2010) (“Debarment shall be for a period
commensurate with the seriousness of the cause(s).”).
237. James C. Nobles, Jr. & Christina Maistrellis, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Systematic Solution for the U.S. Multinational, L. & BUS. REV. AMS., Spring 1995, at 5, 11;
see also J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael,
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 102 (2007) (“There is substantial
evidence that white collar defendants are strongly deterred by civil/administrative sanctions,
including debarment.”).
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than mere fines, which merely become costs of doing business to firms that
continue to make multiples more through subsequent government contracts.
2. Increased Self-Disclosure Without Increased Enforcement Costs
Investigating foreign corruption can be time consuming and extremely
expensive for the FBI, DOJ, and SEC. With limited resources at their
disposal, federal prosecutors encourage companies to disclose cases in
which the company believes it may have violated the FCPA. Doing so
allows prosecutors to devote more of their time and energy towards
prosecuting cases in which a suspected corporate wrongdoer has taken steps
to conceal its corrupt practices. Seeking to avoid this, the DOJ would likely
suggest debarment in only those cases that eat up public resources due to
prolonged discovery that could have been avoided through voluntary
disclosure.
To incentivize self-disclosure, the DOJ has promised that it will
“meaningfully reward” voluntary disclosures with lesser penalties.238 The
“reward” for voluntary disclosure is a lighter sentence. Professor Koehler
identifies a variety of means through which prosecutors entice companies to
voluntarily disclose potential violations, which include a “corporation’s
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to
cooperate in the investigation of its agents” as well as its “cooperat[ion]
with the relevant government agencies.” 239 He also notes that an important
consideration in deciding to self-disclose “is that such a course of conduct
is more efficient and certain compared to the DOJ independently finding
out about the conduct (however slight the possibility) and harshly
penalizing the company for failing to voluntarily disclose.” 240 Given the
dire results associated with debarment, the consequence of which is viewed
by most companies as being more severe than being fined, companies will
be even more inclined to dispose of such risk through voluntary disclosure.
The relevant debarment provisions of FAR similarly call for agencies to
consider leniency when (1) the company conducted a thorough internal
investigation of the matter, (2) it reported the findings of its investigation to
the government, (3) the agency believes the corrupt employee or employees
were adequately disciplined, (4) measures were implemented to ensure
future compliance with the FCPA, and (5) adequate deterrent measures
were in place when the violation occurred. 241
Seeking to curry favor with prosecutors and agencies, the heightened
severity associated with suspension or debarment may compel a greater
number of companies to self-disclose their corrupt dealings in hopes of

238. Breuer, supra note 43, at 5.
239. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.300 (2008) [hereinafter
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations]; see also Koehler, supra note
97, at 925.
240. Koehler, supra note 97, at 926.
241. FAR 9.406-1(a) (2010).
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avoiding the FCPA’s harshest of penalties. 242 By debarring companies in
egregious, highly public cases of foreign corruption, federal prosecutors can
leverage the escalated level of risk associated with debarment to incentivize
more companies to come forward in exchange for leniency. 243
E. The Discretionary Debarment Decision
Prosecutors exercise a significant degree of charging discretion.244 A
prosecutor’s decision to pursue claims of bribery under the FCPA (thereby
triggering an agency’s discretionary debarment power) rather than charging
the contractor under an alternative applicable statute, directly affects
whether the company is subject to mandatory debarment, discretionary
debarment, or is altogether immune from the risk of suspension or
debarment. Prosecutors also indirectly influence debarment officials
through frequent meetings and intra-agency cooperation.
1. Are Corrupt Government Contractors “Too Big to Debar”?
Although prosecutors exercise a significant degree of influence over an
agency’s discretionary debarment decision as discussed above, the ultimate
decision rests with the agencies that do business with corrupt contractors.
In 1987 alone, the Department of Defense’s “total suspensions and
debarments of contractors totaled 898,” which was “over three times the
280 actions taken in fiscal year 1983.” 245 Yet despite “[m]any of the U.S.
government’s largest contractors hav[ing] been found to have repeatedly
broken the law or engaged in misconduct” between 1990 and 2002, only
one of the top forty-three government contractors was suspended or
debarred during this period. 246 These figures lend support to the Project on
Government Oversight’s conclusion “that large contractors enjoy an unfair
advantage over smaller contractors in navigating the federal government’s
suspension and debarment system.” 247
Admittedly, debarment differs from other FCPA sanctions in the
collateral costs it imposes on the government, besides its particular burdens
on the sanctioned violator. Other agencies, which have no input in the
decision about sanctioning FCPA violators, may have long running
242. See Wray & Hur, supra note 231, at 1115.
243. See, e.g., id. (“[The Department of Defense (DoD)] adopted a voluntary disclosure
program that provides for the possibility of more lenient treatment for contractors that selfreport. In order to encourage companies to self-report potential violations and agree to
cooperate with the ensuing audits and investigations, DoD offers companies the increased
likelihood of avoiding suspension and debarment—sanctions that are, for defense
contractors, even more deathly than corporate criminal charges themselves.”).
244. See Wagoner, supra note 131, at 1108–12.
245. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-88-5BR, DOD FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:
CHARACTERISTICS, SANCTIONS, AND PREVENTION (1988).
246. Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System,
POGO (May 10, 2002), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/contract-oversight/federalcontractor-misconduct/co-fcm-20020510.html. The lone suspension lasted a mere five days.
Id.
247. Id.

810

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

contractual relationships with the same company,248 especially for large
corporations like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Halliburton.249 When such
contracts come up for renewal (presumably debarment would not terminate
all other existing contracts), the government has the inconvenience and
bears the costs of finding a suitable replacement.250 In some cases, this is
virtually impossible due to the scale of some federal projects and the
enormous set-up costs for providers.251
The DOJ echoed these concerns in its response to several questions about
its stance on drafting legislation compelling mandatory debarment for
FCPA violations: “If every criminal FCPA resolution were to carry with it
mandatory debarment consequences, then prosecutors would lose the
necessary flexibility to tailor an appropriate resolution given the facts and
circumstances of each individual case.”252 The real reason for the DOJ’s
rejection of the mandatory debarment proposal appears to be evident in the
preceding sentence of its response—that sanctioning those perceived as
being too big to debar despite egregious FCPA violations “would likely
lead to the cessation of revenues for a government contractor—a virtual
death knell for the contractor–company.”253
2. Prosecutors’ Influence over Debarment Decisions
An agency’s decision to suspend or debar a contractor from future
business with the United States is a direct result of whatever charges federal
prosecutors brought against the firm.
For example, BAE’s
misrepresentation of $5 million in bribes and kickbacks paid to a Saudi
official fell squarely within the language of the FCPA’s accounting
provision.254 A more general statute criminalizes the submission of false
statements to the United States.255 Yet because BAE was prosecuted under
the latter statute (which does not trigger an agency’s discretionary
debarment authority) rather than the former (which triggers an agency’s

248. See generally John S. Pachter, The New Era of Corporate Governance and Ethics:
The Extreme Sport of Government Contracting, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 247 (2004)
(arguing against the use of debarment as a sanction).
249. See generally Jennifer S. Zucker, The Boeing Suspension: Has Increased
Consolidation Tied the United States Department of Defence’s Hands?, 13 PUB.
PROCUREMENT L. REV. 260 (2004).
250. See CATHERINE DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PRIVATE
PARTIES 79–81, 94 (2007). For discussion of the “switching costs” problem in other areas of
government contracting, see Dru Stevenson, Privatization of State Administrative Services,
68 LA. L. REV. 1285, 1291, 1303 (2008); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services:
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 115 (2003).
251. See Danielle Brian, Contractor Debarment and Suspension: A Broken System, 13
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 235, 236–38 (2004); Zucker, supra note 249, at 273–76.
252. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2010) [hereinafter Examining Enforcement] (questions for the record by Sen. Christopher
Coons).
253. Id.
254. See Koehler, supra note 97, at 994–95.
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
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discretionary debarment authority), BAE was insulated from suspension or
debarment from its contracts with the United States.
The DOJ denies ever using specific language in settlements that would
prevent debarments and suspensions. Breuer insisted at the Senate
hearings, “I don’t think we ever do, Senator.” 256 As one commentator
pointed out, however, this position is inconsistent given that the DOJ
sentencing memoranda in its Siemens prosecution explicitly stated that it
selected sanctions that would avoid “collateral consequences” that would
result from criminal FCPA anti-bribery charges. 257 This included the “risk
of debarment and exclusion from government contracts.”258 BAE is
another major United States government contractor; DOJ pleadings against
it aver that in “2008, BAE was the largest defense contractor in Europe and
the fifth largest in [America] as measured by sales.” 259
The DOJ faced a series of follow-up questions after a November 2010
hearing on FCPA enforcement held by the Senate Judiciary Committee.
When asked whether “a mandatory, conduct-based, debarment remedy for
companies that engage in egregious bribery [would] further the deterrent
effect of the FCPA,” the DOJ conceded the possibility, but stated that the
deterrent effect of mandatory debarment “would likely be outweighed by
the accompanying decrease in incentives for companies to make voluntary
disclosures, remediate problems, and improve their compliance
systems.” 260
F. H.R. 5366: Overseas Contractor Reform Act
The infamous phrase “too big to fail” became part of our national lexicon
following the collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008. 261 Initially,
government officials used this phrase to describe the dire economic
consequences that would follow the failure of one of the nation’s bedrock
banks. Following the government’s “bailout” of banks that were seen as
being too big to fail, however, enraged voters increasingly used the phrase
to criticize the conflict of interest that resulted from the government’s
overreliance on a handful of private sector entities. Thus, the phrase
highlights the dangers of placing too many matters of public concern in the
hands of too few companies.
Cognizant of this emerging concern among its constituents, on
September 15, 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Overseas

256. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. Lanny
A. Breuer).
257. Koehler, supra note 97, at 996.
258. Id. (citing Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008)).
259. Id. at 996 (citing Complaint at ¶ 1, United States v. BAE Sys., No. 1:10-cr-00035
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2010)).
260. Examining Enforcement, supra note 252.
261. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—
AND THEMSELVES (2009).
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Contractor Reform Act 262 (OCRA). The initial success of the OCRA,
which would have required that federal agencies consider debarring
government contractors that violate the FCPA, was likely due to the
escalating concern that government contractors that engage in egregious
acts of foreign corruption might similarly be viewed as “too big to debar.”
In 2011, Senator Franken expressed this concern to Assistant Attorney
General Breuer, as quoted above: “I think part of the problem is that we’re
too dependent on a handful of very large contractors, particularly when it
comes to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that too many contractors
maybe now are too big to fail.” 263 The bill never came to a vote in the
Senate.
Senator Franken’s follow-up question to Breuer called attention to the
fundamental weakness of the OCRA’s proposed language, when he asked,
“How frequently is DOJ putting in settlements—specific language that can
be used to prevent debarments and suspensions?” 264 Mr. Breuer assured
the Senator that the DOJ never considers the possibility of debarment when
deciding whether to prosecute a large government contractor’s foreign
bribery and subsequent cover-up under the FCPA (thereby triggering
discretionary debarment) or a similar law (e.g., false statements under 18
U.S.C. §1001) that avoids triggering discretionary debarment. 265
The DOJ and SEC have admitted to considering the “collateral
consequences” of prosecuting foreign corruption under the FPCA on a
number of occasions, and in fact, have official instructions to do so.266 In
prosecuting BAE for falsely recording bribe payments, the DOJ used nonFCPA charges to avoid exposing one of the United States’ key defense
suppliers to the EU’s mandatory debarment provisions triggered by the
FCPA. 267 Prosecutors similarly structured settlement language to avoid
debarment in the Siemens 268 and Daimler 269 cases. Finally, when directly

262. H.R. 5366, 111th Cong. (2010). The proposed language would require that “any
person found to be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 shall be
proposed for debarment from any contract or grant awarded by the Federal Government
within 30 days after a final judgment of such violation” unless waived by the agency. Id.
263. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Sen. Franken).
264. Id.
265. Id. (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen. Lanny A. Breuer).
266. See Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 239,
§ 9-28.300. In determining whether and what to charge a corporation with, in connection to
foreign corruption, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations instructs
prosecutors to consider the “collateral consequences, including whether there is
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven
personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution” in bringing
charges. Id. § 9-28.300-A.7.
267. BAE Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 191. BAE’s sentencing memorandum
explained, “BAES’s business is primarily from government contracts, including with several
EU customers.” Id. at 15.
268. Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No.
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (“The Department’s analysis of collateral
consequences included the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from
government contracts.”).
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questioned about its stance on imposing mandatory debarment on
contractors that engage in particularly egregious acts of corruption, the DOJ
asserted that “a mandatory conduct-based debarment remedy for companies
could well have a negative impact on the Government’s ability to
investigate and prosecute transnational corruption effectively.”270
These examples illustrate the fatal flaw of the OCRA’s requirement that
agency heads consider suspending or debarring contractors that violate the
FCPA—that is, the prosecutors still have the ability to avoid triggering such
proceedings simply by refusing to prosecute foreign corruption under the
FCPA. Prosecutors are not solely to blame, though. Even in cases outside
the ambit of the FCPA, FAR provides agencies with the discretion to
suspend or debar contractors that engage in bribery wholly apart from
prosecutions conducted by the SEC and DOJ. 271 As Mr. Breuer pointed out
to Senator Franken, federal prosecutors “don’t have the expertise of the
department or agency who has to decide how valuable [a] particular
contractor is,” 272 nor do they have statutory authority to do so.
As a result, the responsibility to deter foreign corruption through
suspension and debarment largely falls on each federal agency that transacts
business with private contractors. The leaders within these agencies should
regularly consult with the DOJ, Congress, and other policy makers to
determine whether avoiding the collateral consequences that may result
from debarring contractors viewed as “too big to debar” justifies the mixed
messages and toxic side effects that result from the United States’
complacency in preventing the spread of corruption.
G. The “Collateral Consequences” of Debarment
All too often, corruption functions as a buffer against policy-based
regulations. 273 Federal prosecutors play an important role as “vehicle[s]
effecting widespread structural reform within corrupt corporate cultures,”
and therefore must balance a number of competing interests when deciding

269. Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 1:10-cr-00063
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010) (noting that the DOJ’s “analysis of collateral consequences included
the consideration of the risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts, and in
particular included European Union Directive 2004/18/EC, which provides that companies
convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government contracts
in all EU countries.”).
270. Examining Enforcement, supra note 252.
271. Under FAR 9.406-2, an agency may, at its discretion, debar a contractor for
“[c]ommission of . . . bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false
statements, . . . [or c]ommission of any other offense indicating a lack of business integrity
or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a
Government contractor or subcontractor.” FAR 9.406-2(a)(3), (5) (2010) (emphasis added).
272. Protecting American Taxpayers, supra note 56 (statement of Asst. Att’y Gen.
Breuer).
273. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 30, at 472 (describing the view that laws do not
sufficiently deter multinationals from “vigorously pursu[ing] corruptly influenced contracts,”
as well as the opposite view, which asserts that “moral signals from the countries that have
prohibited corruption by statute” sufficiently deter foreign corruption).
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how best to punish and deter foreign corruption. 274 In exercising their
discretion over such matters, prosecutors must consider the broad-ranging
implications that economic sanctions may have on companies with
thousands of employees working in dozens of countries.
With so many moving parts, prosecutors have the unenviable task of
considering the seemingly infinite number of scenarios that might unfold
following charges of corruption. Thus, “[t]he FCPA ultimately proves to be
a large-scale study in the law of unintended consequences.” 275 The global
scale of most FCPA prosecutions makes balancing the United States’ desire
“to aggressively root out corporate fraud” with its competing interest of
“remaining sensitive to the considerable collateral consequences of moving
criminally against an entire entity” a difficult task indeed.276 The risk of
negative “collateral consequences” is particularly high when an FCPA
prosecution may lead to a company’s suspension or debarment from
government contracts. As a result, in determining whether to prosecute a
company under the FCPA, the DOJ and SEC “consider collateral
consequences” of suspension and debarment when determining whether to
charge companies under the FCPA or under alternative statutes that do not
trigger discretionary suspension and debarment.277
Potential collateral consequences that may result from a government
contract’s suspension or debarment include:
(1) an oligopoly on
government contracts by the remaining few contractors with enough
capacity to satisfy government orders, (2) injured diplomatic relations with
foreign allies, (3) the threat to national security that may occur if the United
States severs ties with key suppliers in the areas of national defense and
energy, (4) the risk that United States businesses may miss out on lucrative
economic opportunities in emerging markets due to the overdeterrent effect
of suspension and debarment, (5) the risk of “disproportionate harm to
shareholders and others who are not personally culpable,” 278 and (6) the
political risk associated with pursuing agency allies in the private sector.

274. Thomas, supra note 16, at 454.
275. Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti-bribery
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 358
(2010).
276. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 166 (2008).
277. Christopher M. Matthews, Mendelsohn and Scarboro Spread the FCPA Gospel,
MAIN JUSTICE (Mar. 23, 2010, 1:27 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/23/
mendelsohn-and-scarboro-spread-the-fcpa-gospel/ (reporting that Mendelsohn admitted that
the DOJ does consider the collateral consequences of suspension and debarment when
structuring settlement agreements “[i]n response to a question about the DOJ’s recent
settlement with BAE Systems”).
278. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING PHASE 3, OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY 16 (May 21, 2010) [hereinafter
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS] (citing Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, supra note 239, § 9-28.300).
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Federal prosecutors have used these considerations in at least three cases
to justify relatively generous plea agreements 279 that avoided exposing the
prosecuted companies to potential suspension or debarment from United
States contracts, and avoided exposing the United States to the collateral
risks associated with such penalties. In response to OECD questions about
the U.S. government’s self-interest in shirking debarment sanctions, U.S.
officials cited the DOJ’s handling of the matters involving BAE
Systems, 280 Siemens, 281 and Daimler 282 as examples of when “the harm
[that] potential debarment would ca[u]se to the public, both in the U.S. and
abroad . . . was taken into consideration in prosecution and sentencing.” 283
1. Concern for Diplomatic Consequences
Federal agencies are aware that the decision to suspend or debar a
multinational company that services foreign allies may lead “to the
complete wreckage of a vital strategic relationship” for the United States. 284
For instance, had federal agencies debarred BAE from continuing to
transact business with the United States, BAE would not have received the
billions of dollars in subsequent U.S. contracts, which in turn would have
resulted in massive layoffs in BAE’s offices across the globe, including the
U.K., India, and Canada.
The U.K. government’s decision to snuff out prosecutors’ inquiry into
the corrupt dealings of key Middle Eastern allies highlights the tension
between the government’s desire to uphold its pledge to root out foreign
corruption and its desire to preserve vital strategic alliances “in critical and
279. That is, plea agreements that did not implicate potential suspension and debarment
despite strong evidence of egregious acts of foreign corruption that likely otherwise justify
such severe penalties.
280. BAE Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 191 (“European Union Directive
2004/18/EC, which has recently been enacted in all EU countries through implementing
legislation, provides that companies convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily
excluded from government contracts.”).
281. See Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft,
No. 1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008).
282. Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG, No. 1:10-cr-00063
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010). The Memorandum states:
In accordance with the Department’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, the Department considered a number of factors in its
decisions regarding the overall disposition. Those factors included, but were not
limited to, Daimler’s cooperation and remediation effort, as well as any collateral
consequences, including whether there would be disproportionate harm to the
shareholders, pension holders, employees, and other persons not proven personally
culpable, and the impact on the public, arising from the prosecution. The
Department’s analysis of collateral consequences included the consideration of the
risk of debarment and exclusion from government contracts, and in particular
included European Union Directive 2004/18/EC, which provides that companies
convicted of corruption offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government
contracts in all EU countries.
Id.
283. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS, supra note 278, at
16–17.
284. Transcript, supra note 178.
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volatile areas of the world.” 285 This may explain why “[t]he DOJ enforced
the [FCPA] with great trepidation” during the first two decades of its
existence, “fearing that the Act’s enforcement would damage relations with
allies” because debarring companies that pay kickbacks to “allied
government officials would be far from diplomatic.” 286
2. Concern for Creating a Monopoly
In addition to the problem of existing interdependent relationships, where
the government actually needs that vendor, 287 there is the problem of
reduced competition for future bidding on new projects. 288 One in four
federal requests for proposal (RFPs) currently receive only one bid, and are
essentially non-competitive, so there are no competitive savings for the
government. This percentage is likely to increase substantially if major
federal contractors face debarment. The result is higher costs for the
government and the taxpayers on future projects. 289
Yet this picture is incomplete, and the cost increases are hard to
quantify. 290 The sanction under consideration is for bribing foreign
government officials in order to obtain lucrative contracts. The purpose of
these bribes is to secure a contract for an inflated price—to win against
lower-cost bidders—or to induce the foreign government to procure goods
and services that it otherwise would not.291 Inflated costs and superfluous
procurements drain the public resources in the countries where the FCPA
violations occur; if the local government is financing the projects through
American foreign aid, the corruption misappropriates American government
resources indirectly. When the same firm is obtaining myriad contracts
domestically, there can be no confidence that it won these contracts fairly
and competitively, at the lowest cost to the American taxpayers.292 Even
where a firm had no prior history of bribery, its success with the foreign
bribe (which became the predicate for FCPA charges) can give the

285. Spalding, supra note 275, at 398.
286. Thomas, supra note 16, at 448–49.
287. See, e.g., Zucker, supra note 249, at 264–70 (discussing the Boeing suspension).
288. See Brian, supra note 251, at 236–38.
289. For more on the problem of monopoly power of certain government contractors, see
John Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and
Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 41, 58–61 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds.,
2009); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 110, 118.
A similar market failure can also occur when the market is highly localized. See ELLIOT D.
SCLAR, YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION
83–90 (2000).
290. See generally Charles E. Hyde & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Can Monopsony Power Be
Estimated?, 76 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1151 (1994) (discussing monopsony effects on prices
and problems with speculating about the effects, outside the context of debarment).
291. See Brian, supra note 251, at 235–38.
292. See Susan M. Collins, What the MCI Case Teaches About the Current State of
Suspension and Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 218, 220–22 (2004).
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corporation a taste for the convenience of ill-gotten gains. 293 We should
not underestimate the corrupting influence of the bribe on the firm that
makes it. 294
Moreover, when large firms elude debarment due to the federal
government’s dependence on them, it contributes to the consolidation of the
market (oligopoly trends),295 which further undermines competitive bidding
and potential cost savings from federal outsourcing. 296 In other words,
existing monopsony problems 297 are the biggest obstacle to using
debarment, but preventing monopsony problems is an argument in favor of
using debarment. 298 Monopsony is a dysfunctional market situation where
there is a single buyer of goods or services.299 The “too big to debar”
problem is actually an outgrowth of the inherent monopsony problems with

293. See Brian, supra note 251, at 236–37 (“While there is nothing wrong per se with
having such a programme [for waiving debarment if a contractor creates an internal ethics
compliance program], there is no empirical evidence that the mere existence of these
programmes truly alter the culture of the company. All of the most serious recidivist
companies in the POGO [Project on Government Oversight] database have been members of
the Defense Industry Initiative, and have had internal ethics programmes in operation for
years.”).
294. See id.
295. See id. at 237.
296. See James J. McCullough & Abram J. Pafford, Government Contract Suspension
and Debarment: What Every Contractor Needs to Know, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV.
240, 243–45 (2004) (explaining that some firms ask the government to debar their
competitors so that they can win the bids on future contracts, eliminating the competition).
297. See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 890, 920 (2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009)) (discussing the monopsony problem inherent in the outsourcing of
public benefits to private entities).
298. Monopsony describes situations where there is only one purchaser or funder for
particular services. See id.; see also Dru Stevenson, A Million Little Takings, 14 U. PA. J. L.
& SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 47–49 (2011) (discussing monopsony in the Interest on Lawyers’ Trust
Accounts (IOLTA) context); Dru Stevenson, Rethinking IOLTA, 76 MO. L. REV. 455, 481–
84 (2011) (same). Economists argue that monopsony tends to lower the availability of the
purchased service or good to below-optimal levels. See R. Baldwin et al., Regulating Legal
Services: Time for the Big Bang?, 67 MOD. L. REV. 787, 792 (2004) (discussing the
monopsony problem with legal services in Great Britain); see also generally Robert L. Bish
& Patrick D. O’Donoghue, Public Goods, Increasing Cost, and Monopsony: Reply, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 231 (1973) [hereinafter Bish & O’Donoghue, Public Goods]; Robert L. Bish &
Patrick D. O’Donoghue, A Neglected Issue in Public-Goods Theory: The Monopsony
Problem, 78 J. POL. ECON. 1367 (1970); Michael Cooke & Daniel Lang, The Effects of
Monopsony in Higher Education, 57 HIGHER EDUC. 623 (2009); Josse Delfgaauw & Robert
Dur, From Public Monopsony to Competitive Market: More Efficiency but Higher Prices,
61 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 586 (2009); Marvin B. Johnson, The Effect of Monopsony Power
on Teachers’ Salaries, 10 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 56 (1978); Hirofumi Shibata, Public
Goods, Increasing Cost, and Monopsony: Comment, 81 J. POL. ECON. 223 (1973).
299. See Rubin, supra note 297, at 920–21.
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government outsourcing. 300 In this sense, however, debarment serves an
incapacitation purpose more than it provides deterrence. 301
The monopsony features inherent in government contracting allow
service providers to manipulate the officials into funding unnecessary
services and to stick with familiar entities rather than newcomers.302
Edward Rubin observes that ultimately “government monopsony breeds
contractor monopoly,” 303 and the monopsony and monopoly effects
“reinforce each other.” 304 The state agencies contracting with private firms
are “subject to concerted efforts from each potential contractor interested in
persuading it to adopt a program design that only that contractor can
fulfill.” 305
3. Concern for Economic Consequences of Overdeterrence
One of the central tenets of law and economics holds that punishing
borderline corporate misconduct with severe penalties may unintentionally
lead to overdeterrence. In other words, “salutary . . . conduct might be
shunned by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face
of uncertainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even
a good-faith error of judgment.” 306
No doubt the legitimate threat of suspension and debarment would
significantly decrease American companies’ willingness to engage in
corrupt practices to bolster their bottom line. That said, such a sword of
Damocles 307 might deter U.S. companies from pursuing otherwise
profitable business opportunities in emerging markets because of the
company’s increased exposure to corrupt foreign officials.308 As prosperity
shifts to emerging markets overseas, those companies may forego profitable
ventures to avoid the unlikely, but highly troubling risk of FCPA
debarment.309

300. See Brian, supra note 251, at 235 (“[Until 2004], it appeared that large federal
contractors had been immune to being suspended or debarred from obtaining additional
government contracts . . . [because] not one major contractor had been suspended or
debarred in a decade—despite all the misconduct that populates [the Project on Government
Oversight] database.”).
301. See generally Marcia G. Madsen, The Government’s Debarment Process: Out-ofStep with Current Ethical Standards, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 252 (2004) (arguing in
favor of more consistent use of debarment, an end to waivers for large corporations, and an
incapacitation-designed approach to the sanction).
302. Id. at 921.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978).
307. See Schooner, supra note 12, at 214.
308. See Spalding, supra note 275, at 355–56; see also Bixby, supra note 47, at 104.
309. Lacey, supra note 134, at 440 (“The long-term effect of increasing corporate
regulation during the past three decades and the worldwide interest in preventing business
corruption should reduce the number of executives willing to risk the penalties and the
public censure.”).
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In addition to its chilling effect on commerce, penalizing FCPA
violations with suspension and debarment may result in two other negative
unintended side effects. First, such severe penalties may “breed[]
overcompliance by risk-averse companies mindful of the consequences of a
DOJ [FCPA] inquiry—even if that inquiry is not based on viable legal
theories.” 310 By threatening to cut off a contractor’s primary revenue
stream (i.e., government contracts) if one of its employees gets caught
tendering bribes in a foreign country, suspension and debarment shift a
company’s incentive away from making desirable capital outlays
(streamlining its supply chain, R&D, increasing its capacity, etc.) to
investing in extensive compliance measures.311
On the other hand, perhaps the threat of suspension and debarment
provide the necessary incentive for companies that might not otherwise
implement adequate ethics and compliance programs. Similarly, although
the deterrent potency of the increased use of suspension and debarment may
lead to an overinvestment in unnecessary corporate compliance, tendering
briefcases full of cash to low-level officials, showering foreign royalty with
lavish gifts, and stashing millions of dollars into secret corporate slush
funds can hardly be viewed as sound investments.
The use of suspension and debarment as an FCPA sanction may also
raise concerns that the increased possibility of such a severe penalty may
have a chilling effect on a company’s voluntary disclosure of bribery. 312
Although legitimate, the chilling effect is easy to avoid for the same reasons
that self-reporting has actually increased in recent years alongside the size
of fines imposed under the FCPA. Prosecutors have successfully
incentivized self-disclosure with promises of lenient sentencing in the form
of lesser fines.
“Even when the Government impose[s] neither suspension nor
debarment, the threat of a corporate death penalty provides incentive for
firms to enter into less draconian compliance agreements, and then comply
with the terms of those agreements.” 313 As a result, the perception that
suspension and debarment are more severe than potential fines may actually
result in a greater number of voluntary disclosures.314

310. Examining Enforcement, supra note 34, at 8 (statement of Professor Mike Koehler).
311. On the other hand, perhaps the threat of suspension and debarment provides the
necessary incentive for companies that might not otherwise implement adequate ethics and
compliance programs. Similarly, although the deterrent potency of the increased use of
suspension and debarment may lead to an overinvestment in unnecessary corporate
compliance, tendering briefcases full of cash to low-level officials, showering foreign
royalty with lavish gifts, and stashing millions of dollars into secret corporate slush funds
can hardly be viewed as sound investments.
312. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 154.
313. Schooner, supra note 12, at 214.
314. See Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 140, at 154–55.
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CONCLUSION
The FCPA is an important statute for combating corruption globally, and
for maintaining the integrity of federal outsourcing relationships at home.
It has taken on increasing significance in recent years as FCPA enforcement
has grown and penalties have spiraled upward. The sanctions are still too
thin, however. The restricted set of sanctions the government has been
using against violators is hampering the effectiveness of the FCPA in
achieving Congress’s purpose of deterring bribery and fraud in government
contracting.
Despite the magnitude of recent fines and penalties for FCPA violators,
these sanctions represent a tiny fraction of the potential revenue available
from lucrative government contracts. Discounted by the low probability of
detection, the fines and penalties are far too low to deter unlawful activity,
especially when firms obtain even larger contracts with the federal
government following the sanctions. There is also an inherent unfairness,
or at least imprudence, in awarding enormous government contracts to
firms that the government has just prosecuted for fraudulently obtaining
foreign contracts. Worse, the largest firms with the most government
contracts have the least incentive to comply with the law.
Debarment would be a far more potent deterrent, if the government was
serious about reducing corruption, and would fit more logically into the
policy goal of protecting public funds from misappropriation. Debarment
would deter potential wrongdoers and incapacitate previous offenders. It is
unfortunate, therefore, that the enforcement agencies consistently refuse to
seek suspension or debarment of firms that flout the FCPA. Of course, it
would not be painless for the government to lose certain established
contractors, but given that debarments typically last only two years, this is
more of a temporary inconvenience for the government. For the firms
caught bribing foreign officials, however, a two-year hiatus from all
government contracts presents remarkable opportunity costs. The deterrent
would induce more firms to comply with the law, allowing the “too big to
debar” problem to diminish over time. This would foster greater
confidence in the federal government at home and abroad, and would help
fledgling governments in developing countries mature into effective
political systems.

